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Abstract
As Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) become more widely used, se-
curity concerns have been raised regarding FPGA use for cryptographic, sensitive,
or proprietary data. Storing or implementing proprietary code and designs on FP-
GAs could result in the compromise of sensitive information if the FPGA device
was physically relinquished or remotely accessible to adversaries seeking to obtain
the information. Although multiple defensive measures have been implemented (and
overcome), the possibility exists to create a secure design through the implementa-
tion of polymorphic Dynamically Reconfigurable FPGA (DRFPGA) circuits. Using
polymorphic DRFPGAs removes the static attributes from their design; thus, sub-
stantially increasing the difficulty of successful adversarial reverse-engineering attacks.
A variety of dynamically reconfigurable methodologies exist for implementation that
challenge designers in the reconfigurable technology field.
A Hardware Description Language (HDL) DRFPGA model is presented for use
in security applications. The Very High Speed Integrated Circuit HDL (VHSIC)
language was chosen to take advantage of its capabilities, which are well suited to
the current research. Additionally, algorithms that explicitly support granular au-
tonomous reconfiguration have been developed and implemented on the DRFPGA as
a means of protecting its designs. Documented testing validates the reconfiguration
results and compares power usage, timing, and area estimates from a conventional
and DRFPGA model.
iv
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I owe all to my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, for His countless
blessings and eternal salvation.
Next, my gratitude and thanks to my lovely wife and daughter for their under-
standing through sleepless nights and very full days. Without their selfless support,
I would not be here today.
Thanks to my parents, sisters, and brother all scattered around the world...you
never once tired of hearing my “adventure” stories no matter how many times I
repeated them! Your support means so much to me.
A big thank you to my father-in-law for sharing his AFIT experience and some
intense hours of poring over thesis edits...as usual, above and beyond.
To the VLSI crew, lots of thanks for the help and support in everything from
VHDL questions to those late night discussions on the abstract and asinine topics
that kept us from loosing our minds.
Thanks to our sponsors for the support and direction. They are a truly critical
link in bringing academic ideas to the operational world. Your continued advice and
guidance will determine the future of our Air Force!
Thank you as well to the AFIT professors that have guided and evaluated my
learning through the last 18 months. My time here has exposed me to a wealth of
knowledge and expertise. The lessons learned will be applied throughout my career
and in everything I do.
Finally, thanks to my advisor for his passion and understanding. An expert in
his field and in assisting to shape my work into a presentable, polished form. You’ve
spent some long days here in support of this research and for that I am grateful.
Samuel J. Stone
v
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Scope and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Materials and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.6 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 FPGA Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 FPGA Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Bitstream Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 JTAG Programming Interface . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Vulnerabilities Affecting FPGAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Vulnerabilities Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Bitstream Interception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3 Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.4 Passive Circuit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.5 Altered Bitstream Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.6 Bitstream Readback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.7 Vulnerabilities Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Dynamic Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Dynamic Reconfiguration Overview . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Dynamically Reconfigurable Designs . . . . . . 22
2.3.3 Dynamic Reconfiguration Challenges . . . . . . 24
2.4 Polymorphic Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Polymorphic Reconfiguration Overview . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Polymorphic Reconfigurable FPGA Designs . . 26
vi
Page
2.4.3 Polymorphic Reconfiguration Challenges . . . . 27
2.4.4 Polymorphic Reconfiguration Summary . . . . . 27
III. Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.2 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Research Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 System Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5 Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6.1 SUT Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6.2 Workload parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.7 Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.8 Evaluation Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.9 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.10 Methodology Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.11 Custom FPGA Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.11.1 CLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.11.2 Control Registers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.11.3 FPGA Data Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.11.4 CLB Programming Network . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.11.5 LUT Inversion Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.11.6 DRFPGA Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.12 Reconfiguration Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.12.1 LUT Inversion Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.12.2 Functional Replacement Algorithm . . . . . . . 53
3.12.3 Obfuscation Mask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.13 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
IV. Test Process and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1 Test Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1.1 Test Circuit Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1.2 Test Circuit Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.3 Adder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.4 Counter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1.5 Comparator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.1 Reconfiguration Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
vii
Page
4.2.2 Adder Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.3 Counter Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2.4 Comparator Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.1 Test Results Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.2 Circuit Operation and Performance . . . . . . . 69
4.3.3 DRFPGA Programming Network Performance . 73
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
V. Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1 Bitstream Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Reverse Engineering Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3 Circuit Protection Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3.1 Bitstream Interception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3.2 Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3.3 Passive Circuit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3.4 Altered Bitstream Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3.5 Bitstream Readback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
VI. Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.1 Autonomous Secure DRFPGA Platform . . . . . . . . . 89
6.2 Biological Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3 Reliability and Self-healing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 Defragmentation and Self-Optimizing . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix A. CLB Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Appendix B. LUT Inversion Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Appendix C. Test Circuit LUT Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Appendix D. Test Circuit Schematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Appendix E. JTAG Programming Network Example . . . . . . . . . . 111
Appendix F. CLB Addressable Programming Network Example . . . 113
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
viii
List of Figures
Figure Page
2.1. Simplified FPGA structure demonstrating the fundamental com-
ponents common amongst FPGAs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. General JTAG boundary cell schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Results of fault injection on the successful completion of a basic
AES encryption algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4. SRAM array as viewed through Wentworth manual prober. . . 16
2.5. VLIW Reconfigurable Processor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6. An abstract diagram highlighting evolutionary (left side) and
traditional (right side) digital circuit design approaches [23]. . 26
3.1. Abstract representation of the Reconfigurable FPGA as the SUT. 32
3.2. VHDL CLB model diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3. Simple demonstration of the bubble pushing concept on a gate
level circuit schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4. Simple demonstration of the pushing bubbles concept as applied
to the LUT circuit schematic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1. Functional configuration diagram for n bit ripple carry adder. . 60
4.2. Functional configuration diagram for an n-bit counter. . . . . . 61
4.3. Gate level implementation of a simple binary comparator. . . . 62
4.4. Functional diagram demonstrating the hierarchical structure of
a binary comparator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5. Demonstration of the counter output errors due to operation of
the circuit during the reconfiguration process. . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.6. Demonstration of the proper method to reconfigure a sequential
circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.7. Graph of the power usage for JTAG, CLB addressable network,
and LUT inversion network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.8. Graph of the clock cycles required for JTAG, CLB addressable
network, and LUT inversion network reconfiguration . . . . . . 77
ix
Figure Page
5.1. Demonstration of the phased defense method of obfuscating the
bitstream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2. Demonstration of the functional replacement method of obfus-
cating the input and output of a given circuit. . . . . . . . . . 82
A.1. Schematic of a CLB as based on the schematics of the Xilinxr
Virtex4r FPGA [2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1. Sample circuit for LUT inversion demonstration. . . . . . . . . 95
B.2. Demonstration of steps one and two of the LUT inversion algo-
rithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B.3. Demonstration of steps three and four of the LUT inversion al-
gorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.4. The final product of the LUT inversion algorithm. . . . . . . . 98
B.5. Test waveforms demonstrating the application of the LUT inver-
sion algorithm on a VHDL LUT circuit model. . . . . . . . . . 99
D.1. Test circuit for 8-bit adder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
D.2. Test circuit for 8-bit counter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
D.3. Test circuit for 8-bit comparator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
D.4. Test circuit for 8-bit comparator circuit used for functional re-
placement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
E.1. An example of an 8 node JTAG Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
F.1. An example of an 16 node CLB addressable network. . . . . . . 113
x
List of Tables
Table Page
2.1. Truth table representation of two input AND gate. . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Potential outcomes of SUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2. Experimental input counts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1. Specifications for the test circuit pre and post reconfiguration. . 71
4.2. Area results for reconfiguration hardware. . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
C.1. Ripple Carry Adder LUT Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
C.2. Counter LUT Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
C.3. Comparator LUT Values for stage 1 of the comparator operation. 102
C.4. Comparator LUT Values for stage 2 of the comparator operation. 103
C.5. Comparator LUT Values for the functional replacement com-
parator, phase 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
C.6. Comparator LUT Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
xi
List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Page
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
DRFPGA Dynamically Reconfigurable FPGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
HDL Hardware Description Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
VHSIC Very High Speed Integrated Circuit HDL . . . . . . . . . . iv
CT Critical Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . 6
SRAM Static Random Access Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
LUT Look Up Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
JTAG Joint Test Action Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ROM Read Only Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication . . 13
PLA Programmable Logic Array . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
SUT System Under Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
CUT Component Under Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
TMR Triple Modular Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
xii
Anti-Tamper Method for Field Programmable Gate
Arrays
Through
Dynamic Reconfiguration and Decoy Circuits
I. Introduction
The United States (US) military maintains military dominance because of thequality of its members, training, and technological superiority. Due to the
relatively low cost of exploitation and abundance of reverse engineering tools and
methods, the technology used by the US military is a common target for adversaries.
Technology acquisition through subversive means and analysis/reverse engineering
of US military Critical Technologies ( CT) represents a significant threat to the US
military’s technological lead over adversaries. In order to counter this threat, it is
essential that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Air Force
(USAF) implement procedures to safeguard proprietary technology.
It is not enough to assume that current safeguards will keep DoD equipment and
CTs out of adversarial hands. A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
published in 2007 describes a critical shortcoming in the DoD’s ability to maintain
control of its equipment. Over 190,000 weapons meant to be distributed to the Iraqi
Security Forces are unaccounted for [11]. These weapons not only represent million of
dollars in DoD funds, but also US military technologies that could be in possession of
entities we are facing in combat. Without additional safeguards the DoD could lose
the technological edge gained through research and development of CTs.
One of the relatively new technologies seeing increasing use in the USAF is the
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). A particularly critical vulnerability inher-
ent in the current FPGA platforms is the ease of reverse engineering. Because FPGAs
contain flexible architecture defined by stored configuration data, circuit functions
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implemented on the devices are susceptible to theft and tampering. Consequently,
adversaries may be able to identify and reverse engineer the functionality of FPGAs
used in military applications. In addition to reverse engineering, there exist malicious
entities interested in tampering with FPGA circuits; thus, altering their operation.
If an FPGA device is unaccounted for, as was the case for the 190,000 weapons in
Iraq, then any technology associated with the device can be considered compromised.
Additionally, deployed FPGA systems are not secured against tampering and cannot
be considered safe for use in critical applications. Countermeasures for threats against
military FPGA designs must be investigated and implemented to secure FPGA de-
signs and CTs.
FPGAs offer substantial potential for dynamic reconfiguration by harnessing the
strengths of the FPGA architecture, but current technology is not sufficient to pro-
tect DoD CTs against theft and malicious misuse. Someone must address the crucial
need for CT protection to maintain the DoD’s technological lead over adversaries.
This research analyzed current FPGA architectures and proposes a new enhanced
anti-tampering capable architecture fulfilling the need for a method of securing CTs.
A particular focus is the use of dynamic reconfiguration to defend against adversarial
tamper and reverse engineering attacks. The ability to create decoy circuits on the
FPGA is explored and demonstrated. The proposed methods are included in the
simulated architecture design and verified through synthesis. The final design incor-
porates dynamic programming and decoy circuits to secure FPGA implemented CTs
from adversarial theft.
1.1 Problem Statement
Current FPGA architecture does not provide adequate protection against ad-
versarial tampering or reverse-engineering attacks targeting DoD technology. There
exists ample documentation on the vulnerabilities affecting FPGAs to allow adver-
saries with relatively modest experience and/or resources to successfully obtain FPGA
implemented designs or even alter programs to operate in a manner inconsistent with
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the intended application. While defensive technologies exist on modern designs, these
do not address all methods used by malicious adversaries. Additionally, capabilities
in the promising dynamic configuration field fall short of the required granularity,
efficiency, and overall effectiveness for adequate defence against theft and tampering.
1.2 Goals
This research directly supports the AFRL/RYT’s mission of developing tech-
nologies to prevent or delay the exploitation of critical program information. In a
broader sense, this research supports the Air Force’s air superiority mission through
safeguarding of critical technological intellectual property; so that weapon system
capabilities stay out of adversarial hands. This research extends beyond the USAF
mission to support the nation’s technological edge and its research and development
investment protection by preventing or delaying the exploitation of critical technol-
ogy. The desired outcome is a new architecture and supporting dynamic configuration
methods that can be implemented in USAF weapons systems at a reasonable cost in
terms of development, manufacturing, and performance degradation.
Hardware design is only one aspect to consider in developing a secure FPGA
design platform. In order to fully take advantage of the custom design, software al-
gorithms use the capabilities of the secure hardware platform. Algorithms using the
hardware must leverage the benefits of dynamic reconfiguration and the reconfigura-
tion hardware must provide adequate granularity. This thesis investigates the total
solution methodology.
Finally, the hardware and algorithm product must compare favorably to current
designs in operation speed, power usage, and size. This research fully compares viable
options while realizing a synthesizable implementation.
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1.3 Scope and Assumptions
The research is limited to the hardware contained within a Xilinxr hardware
model coded in the VHDL programming language. While the model is simulated and
synthesized, actual fabrication or implementation on an FPGA does not fall within the
scope of this research. All research, tests, and results will be limited to digital logic
simulations/synthesis of components contained within the actual FPGA hardware.
External factors (i.e. heat, power limitations) will not be considered.
1.4 Methodology
The foundation for this research is the implementation and evaluation of a
Virtex4r based FPGA device modified to provide dynamic reconfiguration capa-
bilities beyond the existing platforms. The dynamic reconfiguration supports the
execution of defensive measures to include design and bitstream obfuscation. This re-
search proposes two reconfiguration strategies for securing circuits using the custom
hardware design; functional replacement and LUT inversion. While both strategies
serve to protect the design implemented on the proposed FPGA platform, they em-
ploy unique aspects and granularity of dynamic reconfiguration to address different
vulnerabilities.
1.5 Materials and Equipment
The following software programs were used in the modeling, testing, and verifi-
cation of the proposed design:
Mentor Graphics Modelsimr SE 6.2e Allows VHDL file editing and compiling.
Performs VHDL hardware model testing via simulation.
Alterar Quartusr II v6.0 Performs VHDL hardware model interconnection. Ab-
stracts VHDL code to visual diagrams.
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Xilinxr ISETM 9.2i Xilinxr Performs synthesis, design, and verification of imple-
mentation on Xilinxr FPGA devices. Also provides parametric estimates for
operating speed, power, and area requirements for the targeted Xilinxr device.
ActivePerl v5.8.8 Executes FPGA bitstream creation scripts.
1.6 Overview
This document is organized into 6 different chapters. Chapter 1 is the intro-
duction to the problem statement and approach. Chapter 2 provides background on
the vulnerabilities affecting current FPGA designs. Chapter 3 outlines the approach
to solving the problem and testing the method applied. Chapter 4 consolidates the
results of the implementation and testing phase outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 5
summarizes the analysis and conclusions based on Chapter 4’s test results. Finally,
Chapter 6 closes with ideas on future research based on the insights learned from this
research effort.
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II. Background
The following chapter serves to familiarize readers with FPGA designs and theirvulnerabilities. There exist various articles documenting vulnerabilities affect-
ing FPGAs and Integrated Circuits (ICs). While this chapter should not be considered
an all encompassing study of FPGA security, it does serve as an introduction to the
critical dangers facing FPGA designers and users.
This chapter also serves to introduce the concepts behind polymorphic dynamic
configuration; specifically, how it relates to the security of FPGA designs. The reader
is presented with background information on FPGAs and reconfiguration followed
by examples of different dynamic reconfiguration implementations. Finally, potential
challenges and shortcomings in the field of dynamic reconfiguration are explored.
2.1 FPGA Background
2.1.1 FPGA Architecture Overview. As integrated circuit technology has
progressed so has the desire for organizations to create and test their own integrated
circuit designs. Creating a custom integrated circuit in the traditional sense is expen-
sive and the cost per device is prohibitive for cases where a designer is not seeking to
mass manufacture devices. Although Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
devices have provided a relatively low cost method to manufacture low volume designs
for over 25 years, FPGAs have presented an even more flexible way to design, create,
and test custom integrated circuit designs with relatively modest up-front investment
capital.
The primary advantage to using FPGAs is their flexibility and ability to be
reprogrammed. FPGAs are used to implement digital functions in hardware. The
functions are programmed in an HDL such as VHDL or Verilog and saved to a file.
This HDL code file is compiled and downloaded to the FPGA device for implemen-
tation. A similar process can be used to create ASICs with the exception that ASICs
require fabrication at specialized facilities. The FPGA structure allows it to be pro-
grammed with low initial investment and FPGAs can be easily reprogrammed with
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new or updated designs. These attributes make FPGAs a well-suited platform for
low-volume designs as well as digital circuit prototypes.
One of the lead developers in the FPGA field is Xilinxr . Xilinxr FPGAs have
been the platform of choice for dynamic reconfiguration implementations based on
their built-in reconfiguration capabilities [10,16,28,30,33,45]. The Xilinxr Virtex4r
Static Random Access Memory(SRAM) based FPGA was chosen as the base for the
research model in order to provide a capable foundation for dynamic reconfiguration
work. The research into vulnerabilities is relevant to SRAM based FPGAs in general,
not only the Virtex4r .
In general, FPGAs implement user designs through the interconnecting and
configuration of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs). Each CLB is formatted to imple-
ment a small portion of the design using components such as one or more flip-flops,
Look-Up Tables (LUT), and data storage elements. The equivalent component may
have different names for varying FPGA manufacturers; for example, Altera refers to
their CLB equivalent components as Logic Elements (LEs). CLBs are interconnected
by a data network to create the overall design of the circuit. Figure 2.1 shows a
simplified pictorial view of an FPGA.
Figure 2.1: Simplified FPGA Structure. The fundamental components (CLBs)
are interconnected via the data network and data routers. While this description is
oversimplified, it captures the basic understanding necessary for discussion.
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FPGA devices can be decomposed into the following components. The nomen-
clature is Xilinxr specific because of the Virtex4r based model used in this research.
LUT LUTs contain the fundamental functions of the circuit. They function similar
to a truth table in that values are stored within the LUT at locations addressed
by the inputs. A truth table representing a two input AND gate function is
demonstrated in Table 2.1. Some LUTs contain shift register, memory, or other
functions in addition to the ability to implement a truth table.
Slice Each slice contains two LUTs for implementing digital circuits. The slice also
contains routing hardware to select input and output locations and FFs for
implementing sequential designs.
CLB The CLB is the largest functional component within the FPGA. Each CLB
contains 4 slices: two L-Slices and two M-Slices. The M-Slices contain data
storage and shift components in addition to the LUT functions and routing
hardware.
Data Network The data network routes data between the CLBs to implement com-
plex functions.
Bitstream The bitstream is the program stored and implemented on the FPGA. It
is compiled off-chip and downloaded to the FPGA.
Table 2.1: A truth table representation of a two input AND gate. The output value
is selected based on the two inputs as in a logic truth table. A LUT can be viewed
as a hardware implementation of a truth table.
Two Input AND Gate Truth Table
Input A Input B Output Value
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
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2.1.2 Bitstream Overview. FPGAs are configured to match user speci-
fications. Unlike ASICs, which are configured in an ASIC facility and cannot be
reprogrammed, FPGAs can be reprogrammed using a computer with the appropriate
software. Once the user design is created, using either VHDL programming soft-
ware or other specific software for the FPGA, the design is compiled and saved to
the bitstream file. The bitstream contains all configuration data necessary to cre-
ate the user’s design on an FPGA, including the bus routing between CLBs and the
format for every CLB to be used. The bitstream can be saved for implementation
in the future and is the single file needed to recreate the user designs on an FPGA.
The bitstream must be downloaded to the FPGA either from a computer or from
a storage medium such as EPROM/PROM/ROM connected to the FPGA. During
the transmission from the source to the FPGA itself, the bitstream is encrypted on
certain FPGAs (including the Xilinxr Virtex4r ) to prevent capture of the infor-
mation from the transmission lines. For example, on the Virtex4r the bitstream is
encrypted before transmission to the FPGA by the software package used to generate
the bitstream. The encrypted bitstream is then transmitted to the FPGA, where it
is decrypted for use in configuration [1]. Once the bitstream is downloaded onto the
local FPGA storage, the configuration takes place on the FPGA itself. While the
bitstream may be considered the heart of the FPGA, it is also a vulnerable point for
acquisition of the FPGA design. As such, it must be protected to prevent theft of
FPGA designs.
2.1.3 JTAG Programming Interface. Most current FPGA designs use the
Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) boundary scan standard to load the bitstream onto
the FPGA. The boundary scan standard is a serial, sequential method of loading
data into a device for programming or testing. The fundamental component of the
boundary scan system is the boundary scan cell. Figure 2.2 depicts a generalized
schematic of the cell. The cells are arranged in a chain with the To Next Cell line
output feeding the From Previous Cell input on the next cell. This arrangement
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permits the serial loading of test and/or configuration vectors to a device. Each cell
can operate as a shift register, accept new data on the From Previous Cell line, and
provide current data out on the To Next Cell line. As long as the ClockDR clock is
operating and the ShiftDR line is high, the boundary scan cells will continue to shift
data in serially, one bit per clock cycle from the first cell’s From Previous Cell line.
Using this method, an entire FPGA bitstream can be loaded onto the device through
a single bit input. Some FPGAs, including the Xilinxr Virtex4r , also include
functionality to load a single column of CLBs at a time by bypassing portions of the
boundary scan cell chain.
Once the entire chain or the column currently under configuration contains
the configuration bits within the ClockDR fed FFs, the ClockDR signal is halted
and the UpdateDR signal is cycled through one clock cycle while the Mode signal is
high. This process loads a single bit into the selected CLBs in parallel through the
simultaneous loading of every UpdateDR FF. In order to program the FPGA or a
portion of the FPGA, the entire process must be repeated for each bit of the bitstream.
The ClockDR and UpdateDR clocks are able to run at a significantly faster clock rate
than the general system clock since there are limited gates between FFs to increase
delay. See Appendix E for an example of a JTAG programming implementation.
Figure 2.2: General schematic of boundary scan cell based on example presented
by Bushnell and Agrawal. [34].
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2.2 Vulnerabilities Affecting FPGAs
2.2.1 Vulnerabilities Overview. One of the concerns surrounding the use of
FPGAs is the insecurity of the device itself [46]. The configurability of the FPGA is
one of the reasons it is inherently more insecure than standard VLSI ICs. Although
there are numerous papers and studies on a wide variety of FPGA vulnerabilities,
many of the attacks designed to acquire circuits stored on an FPGA focus on the
bitstream. As the bitstream contains all of the necessary information to create the
FPGA design, anyone that is able to compromise the bitstream information would
have complete ability to recreate the design as many times as desired or alter the
design to meet their specifications. If the bitstream is not properly protected, it rep-
resents a significant vector for proprietary design theft. Although there are steps in
place to protect the bitstream, every protective measure comes under attack as more
FPGAs are used for sensitive design implementation. In addition to bitstream at-
tacks, which are particularly well suited for compromising the circuit design, another
focus area is passive circuit analysis. This can be performed either by capturing in-
formation at the circuit boundaries (inputs and outputs) as a non-invasive procedure
or by actually stripping the physical layers of protection from the FPGA and mon-
itoring the hardware. These attack methods are detailed later, but it is important
to understand the methods more likely to be employed by aggressors. The following
FPGA vulnerabilities represent critical vectors for design theft and tampering:
Bitstream Interception Adversaries can capture the bitstream during transmis-
sion from an off-chip location to the FPGA. The bitstream in current FPGA
platforms is encrypted during transmission, but an adversary could leverage
other attacks listed to weaken the encryption and obtain the design.
Fault Injection The goal of fault injection attacks is to provide input or power val-
ues beyond the tolerance of the FPGA hardware. Examples include adjusting
the power supply, clock signal, or inputs to cause the circuit to detour from the
intended operation. Fault injection can be used to alter the design functional-
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ity, cause the circuit to cease functioning completely, or circumvent defensive
functions protecting the bitstream or other critical data.
Passive Circuit Analysis In performance of this attack, adversaries seek to moni-
tor the circuit operation without impacting it. They may capture input/output
combinations, thermal signatures, or inspect individual transistor values to gain
useful information. The information obtained can be used directly to compro-
mise the device or aid in other attacks.
Altered Bitstream Attack Adversaries can modify the bitstream during transmis-
sion to influence the FPGA device operation.
Bitstream Readback FPGAs contain functionality enabling them to provide the
bitstream data via the JTAG interface. There is a security bit in place for
Xilinxr Virtex4r FPGAs to prevent this activity, but other attacks could be
used to bypass the security bit.
2.2.2 Bitstream Interception. As mentioned in the bitstream overview, the
bitstream is transmitted to the FPGA device during the configuration stage. The
FPGAs addressed in this thesis (SRAM FPGAs) must be programmed before use.
Also, it is important to note that due to the volatile nature of the SRAM configuration
cells, the FPGA must be reprogrammed whenever it loses power. It is possible to
intercept the transmission of the bitstream and capture the information for later
analysis during the configuration stages given the off-chip location of the configuration
bitstream. This method is not easily executed as the bitstream is transmitted as an
encrypted file in the current FPGA devices.
Although the bitstream is an important and vulnerable feature of the FPGA, it
was not until 2000/2001 that a mainstream FPGA manufacturer introduced substan-
tial security features on an SRAM FPGA board: the Virtex IIr FPGA by Xilinxr
[26]. Previous to the implementation of encrypted data transfer, the most efficient
means of protecting sensitive information was to program the FPGA in a secure lo-
cation and place the FPGA device on battery backup to keep the volatile memory in
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the FPGA from loosing its configuration [26]. While this method avoids capture of
the bitstream by adversaries, it increases the cost of design due to the need to provide
battery backup for the FPGA device. In addition, it complicates the reconfiguration
process and does not address remote reconfiguration operation vulnerabilities.
In an effort to address the need for more practical means of protecting sensi-
tive design information, the Xilinxr Virtex4r FPGAs utilize encryption during the
transmission of the bitstream to the FPGA. In cases where the storage medium resides
on the same device as the FPGA (i.e. in Read Only Memory (ROM) on the board)
or in cases where the bitstream is transmitted to a remote device, encryption of the
bitstream is essential to protect the design. Early Xilinxr FPGAs used the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) encryption algorithm. DES, which was created in the
late 70s, has become obsolete due to its relatively short key (56 bits) and the devel-
opment of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). A DES encrypted message can
be theoretically cracked in as little as 3.5 minutes using substantial computing power
and investment (on the order of $10MIL). While $10MIL investments may be afford-
able for large organizations and governments, smaller organizations could crack the
DES encryption algorithm in just 2.5 days with as little as $10K invested [44]. Users
with sensitive designs should implement them on FPGAs using the AES standard of
encryption which protects against brute-force bitstream attacks.
The Virtex4r FPGA uses the AES standard, which is the current encryption
standard as described by Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publi-
cation 197 [35]. While this does provide substantial protection due to its increased
key length (at least 128-bits) and improved algorithm, there is still the possibility of
compromise. The key used to decrypt the bitstream must be stored on the actual
FPGA. If an adversary could successfully obtain the key from the FPGA memory,
then it would be a trivial matter to decrypt the messages. Therefore, it is crucial
FPGA designers take special care to protect the region of the FPGA device housing
the encryption key. The physical defenses against value inspection are covered in the
physical inspection vulnerabilities section of this paper.
13
2.2.3 Fault Injection. Fault injection is a generic term describing the injec-
tion of faults into digital systems using a variety of attacks including voltage higher
or lower than system tolerances, voltage spikes, or clock glitches. An attacker may
use any of these methods to cause the system to malfunction with intentions to re-
veal information useful in further attacks. In the case of bitstream vulnerabilities,
fault injection has the most potential with regards to interrupting the encryption
of the bitstream or forcing the FPGA to reveal the bitstream through its readback
functionality.
As stated previously, a primary defense against bitstream theft/reverse engi-
neering is the encryption of the bitstream. Using the AES encryption standard will
render brute force bitstream decryption unfeasible. However, the encryption strength
relies on the successful completion of the encryption process. Attackers with access
to the FPGA and storage medium could use fault injection techniques to interrupt
the bitstream encryption and create a partially encrypted bitstream decipherable in
a more reasonable time than a correctly encrypted bitstream. Therefore, the goal of
an adversary is no longer to break the encryption of the bitstream using brute-force
methods, but rather to interrupt the successful encryption/decryption process.
The AES encryption implemented on the Virtex4r FPGA relies on successive
iterations of encryption and decryption for the creation of a valid encrypted bitstream.
Bertoni, et. al. discuss the impact single and multiple fault injections have on hard-
ware AES encryption processes [13]. Although the tests targeted AES encryption, the
results are pertinent for any iterative encryption process. The core AES encryption
algorithm was found to be susceptible to even single fault injections. The AES algo-
rithm illustrated in Figure 2.3 reveals faults injected at early rounds of the encryption
process resulted in a significantly altered output. In fact, faults injected as late as the
eighth (out of 10) stage resulted in a 50% error rate for the encrypted message.
While an incorrectly encrypted message will not immediately allow an attacker
to obtain a protected design, the tests highlight the susceptibility of the AES algorithm
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Figure 2.3: Results of fault injection on the successful completion of a basic AES
encryption algorithm. Figure 2.a. indicates that faults injected early in the encryption
process result in the highest percentage of errors in the encrypted message (about
50%). Figure 2.b displays the inverse is true for the decryption of a message. [13].
to fault injection. At the very least, the FPGA design will operate in an unknown,
faulty manner, making it possible for a clever, dedicated adversary to use the results to
obtain the security key and/or the design itself. It is important that the encryption
process is supplemented to limit the impact of faults. Unfortunately, many of the
generalized protection methods may not translate to the FPGA design due to limited
space and computational ability. Perhaps the most appropriate protection method is
based on redundancy. By implementing a decryption block following the encryption,
the encrypted message can be validated. Implementation of the decryption hardware
will approximately double the total area and power requirements due to similarities
between the encryption and decryption processes [13]. Therefore, the redundancy
technique may not be applicable for limited resource implementations.
The encryption disruption vulnerability is just one example of how fault in-
jection can be used to circumvent the FPGA design protection methods. Countless
opportunities exist for curious or malicious individuals practicing fault injection tech-
niques against FPGA bitstreams. Redundancy is one method of protecting against
fault injection, but Skorobogatov and Anderson also discuss a method of fault injec-
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tion protection using a “dual-rail” technology [13]. Using this technology, a value is
based on a combination of two lines. For instance, instead of a signal (logical one or
zero) being represented by a single line, the signal would be represented by two lines
having opposite values (i.e. one tied to 5v and the other to ground). Two signal lines
will limit the susceptibility of the circuit to single transistor failures and, according to
the authors, also make the circuit more resistant to power analysis attacks. The dual
rail design significantly increases the area and power consumed by the data routing
hardware. Widespread use of the design within a circuit would also require substantial
changes in the hardware to accommodate the two value interpretation.
2.2.4 Passive Circuit Analysis. Although the circuits contained within
FPGA IC packages are far too small for unaided visual analysis, numerous tools exist
that enable viewing of the circuits and even individual transistors, as demonstrated
in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: SRAM array as viewed through Wentworth Labs MP-901 manual
prober. By illuminating the black circle with a photographer’s flash, Sergei P. Sko-
robogatov and Ross J. Anderson were able to store a ‘1’ in the SRAM cell. Alterna-
tively, by illuminating the region within the white circle, they were able to store a ‘0’
in the cell. In this way, the authors are able to combine Analysis and Fault Injection
techniques [13].
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By viewing transistors and patterns within the design, attackers can identify
key portions of a design and target them. Passive analysis is best used in conjunc-
tion with other methods of tampering with the design. This form of analysis, when
properly carried out, can provide an attacker with valuable information with which
further means of identifying and compromising sensitive design information can be
performed. The Xilinxr FPGAs, like most ICs, have the most rudimentary of defense
mechanisms: they are housed within an IC “package” with an epoxy body covering
the circuit itself. The standard epoxy package housing of most IC designs will not
deter a dedicated attacker from gaining access to the design, but serves mainly to
deter casual investigation or accidental damage to the circuit hardware. Xilinxr has
taken the extra step to cover especially critical portions of their design (i.e. the key for
bitstream encryption) with multiple layers of metal; thus, making the de-packaging
process that much more difficult [42]. This fact combined with the volatile nature
of the key memory greatly reduces the chance of an attacker successfully obtaining
the key. However, the physical barriers should not be considered sufficient to protect
critical designs. Time, experience, and determination will allow an attacker to slowly
strip away physical defences to reveal sensitive designs contained within.
Another popular method of passive analysis is power usage monitoring. By
capturing and studying patterns in the power used by an FPGA, adversaries can
map the timing for the chip processes. This information can be incredibly useful in
carrying out fault injection or other attacks. Kamawal demonstrated that by viewing
the power usage as a waveform, certain key points in an algorithm are visible [25]. As
multiple data sets are captured, a composite signature for the FPGA operation can
be constructed. Pattern analysis will highlight periods of increased activity, possibly
the initial decryption period for an FPGA in the configuration cycle or recurring,
critical tasks. As stated previously, Skorobogatov and Anderson discuss the idea that
incorporating a dual rail logic design may protect against some power analysis attacks.
Another method of protecting against power analysis is the random or pseudo-random
reorganization of FPGA functional components. While there is not a large amount of
17
literature on the use of reconfiguration for power analysis defense, implementation of
an automatically reconfiguring FPGA device will substantially hinder malicious power
analysis attacks and defend against fault injection attempts. By creating a “moving
target” the FPGA designer has taken the element of stability from the attacker and
added an entirely new dimension of information obfuscation.
2.2.5 Altered Bitstream Attacks. It is important to maintain the confiden-
tiality of sensitive or proprietary information stored on an FPGA. Although encryp-
tion of the bitstream may prevent an adversary from obtaining the design, someone
with access to the transmission medium can alter the data flowing to a remotely con-
figured FPGA or simply transmit a message of his choice. Attackers may be more
interested in maliciously altering a bitstream downloaded to the FPGA than stealing
the device’s design. While there has been adequate research on the other vulnerabili-
ties, the altered bitstream vulnerability has not been substantially addressed in open
research. One method of protecting against adversaries planting malicious designs
on an FPGA is to use a combined encryption/authentication scheme as proposed by
Parelkar and Gaj [36]. They propose utilizing the EAX functionality of the AES en-
cryption algorithm to verify that the data received by the FPGA is valid and credible.
Although two methods are presented in their paper, the benefit lies with the FIPS
compliant method as it will more easily obtain accreditation through most agencies.
The primary drawback to authentication implementation is the need for additional
resources on the FPGA, which takes from the overall power/space available for the
primary FPGA functions. If the space and power can be sacrificed, then it is highly
recommended that some form of authentication be implemented especially for critical
devices.
2.2.6 Bitstream Readback. While not technically a vulnerability, users im-
plementing designs on FPGAs must be aware of the readback options available for
the FPGA before fielding the design. The readback functionality is meant to pro-
vide users a way to obtain the bitstream directly from the FPGA typically through a
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JTAG standard interface. The bitstream readback function and standard format for
the connection make the readback function a perfect “first stop” for any adversary
attempting to gain access to the bitstream. Xilinxr offers a simple security setting
on the FPGA to prevent readback of the bitstream [48]. The Xilinxr documenta-
tion states that the only way to change the security setting once it has been set is
to recycle the power or assert the PROGRAM input. Either of the actions will erase
the configuration of the FPGA and require a new configuration stream to be loaded
to the FPGA.
As stated in the fault injection section of this thesis, transistor values can be
altered using optical radiation. This fact casts doubt upon the claim that the security
setting cannot be altered without resetting the FPGA. Although research on this
particular approach is not widespread, it is an important aspect of FPGA security
that must be examined. At the very least, the security bit and readback function
must be considered a potential security hole. Users should not completely rely on this
functionality to protect critical designs.
2.2.7 Vulnerabilities Summary. As with all technology, FPGAs offer great
possibilities, but misuse can seriously hinder any operations relying on the device and
result in compromise of sensitive data. As FPGA use becomes more prevalent for
proprietary designs, so has the overall community effort to discover ways to view/ac-
quire those designs. While there are a variety of methods available to compromise
the FPGA, the bitstream represents a tempting target for adversaries due to its fun-
damental place in the operation and programming of FPGAs. Organizations using
FPGAs must be aware of the existing vulnerabilities and fund protective measure
research to avoid operational impact due to design theft or sabotage. While there is
no one end-all defensive measure for bitstream vulnerabilities, every method studied
and implemented will further ensure that the mission will continue to succeed. Cur-
rently, the actual theft of the bitstream has not been considered as the primary vector
of attack against FPGAs. Without a concerted community effort to discover more
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defensive methods, the FPGA users will remain unaware of the true threat against
their agency’s operations.
2.3 Dynamic Reconfiguration
2.3.1 Dynamic Reconfiguration Overview. The primary advantage to the
use of FPGAs versus other forms of custom circuits (i.e. ASIC, Programmable Logic
Array ( PLA), etc.) is the reconfigurable nature of the circuit. Traditionally, FPGAs
are programmed using a serial or Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface. During the
configuration process, the user downloads a design to the FPGA board using propri-
etary software. The software determines the placement, configuration, and routing of
CLBs. This information is encoded in the bitstream and downloaded to the FPGA.
Once the encoded bitstream is downloaded to the FPGA, the design is implemented.
This method of programming FPGAs leaves the design vulnerable to multiple reverse
engineering attacks. One method of protecting against such attacks is to implement
a polymorphic DRFPGA.
Dynamic reconfiguration refers to the ability of a circuit to reconfigure itself
while in operation. In order to reconfigure the FPGA while it is in operation, the
user must be able to replace some, but not all, of the FPGA components specified
by the bitstream information; thus, retaining the operating functions while replac-
ing or creating additional functional components on the FPGA. The new design is
implemented with little to no impact on the system output or operation. Dynamic
reconfiguration offers no advantages if it imposes the same penalties as completely re-
configuring the device. Dynamic reconfiguration designs cannot only be optimized for
current work loads, but can also retain the ability to perform additional specific tasks.
One relatively common approach is to supplement a general purpose processor with
specific computational modules. An example is Lodi et al.’s Very Long Instruction
Word (VLIW) reconfigurable processor [7]. While a static core provides the major-
ity of the computational functionality, a PiCoGa module is dynamically altered to
meet current processing needs. This allows the processor to use custom designed al-
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gorithms (i.e. Digital Signal Processing (DSP) programs) through the PiCoGa while
also providing the capability to update the existing custom programs or replace them
altogether for differing applications. Figure 2.5 depicts the relation between the static
core and the reconfigurable PiCoGa module.
Figure 2.5: VLIW Reconfigurable Processor by Lodi et. al [7]. The PiCoGa is
reconfigurable dynamically (while in operation) but the remaining modules are static.
Lodi et al. are not the only researchers to propose and implement a recon-
figurable platform. In fact, multiple reconfigurable devices exist for FPGAs taking
advantage of partially modifying the bitstream for a particular FPGA design; how-
ever, Kalte et al. discuss the lack of support and/or commercial programs supporting
partial bitstream reconfiguration [16]. The research of Kalte et al. finds there were
some non-commercial programs available for editing and downloading modified bit-
streams (i. e. PARRBIT), but these tools are not able to fulfill the needs of an
autonomous reconfiguring FPGA. Xilinxr also discusses limited reconfiguration po-
tential for their Virtex IIr line of FPGAs in Application Note 662 [47], but the
reconfiguration is limited in scope to specific functions and does not contribute sig-
nificantly to the dynamic reconfiguration solution. One short-coming is the lack of
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fine granularity. Reconfiguration only applies to predefined modules and cannot be
used to target arbitrary circuits/sub-circuits within the design. More focus is nec-
essary on providing valid flexible solutions for users wishing to implement dynamic
reconfigurable designs on FPGAs.
Polymorphism adds another aspect to the dynamic reconfigurable FPGA field.
This thesis takes a polymorphic design to be one exhibiting granular reconfiguration
and a substantial amount of autonomy when reconfiguring. This definition is not ex-
act, but rather a descriptive outline serving to guide research direction and initiatives.
While existing reconfigurable devices typically rely on predefined substitution of mod-
ules, polymorphism dictates an alteration of state, form, and function as defined in an
algorithm. For instance, while the processor proposed by Lodi et al. is dynamically
reconfigurable, it is not truly polymorphic because it simply replaces designated logic
regions with different predefined functions. Another aspect of polymorphism is the
inferred autonomy of polymorphic circuits. Polymorphic circuits are able to recon-
figure themselves with minimal guidance in place via the reconfiguration algorithm.
This aspect is discussed in depth as an evolutionary design method.
In studying the field of dynamic reconfiguration, it becomes evident that the
primary focus has been reconfigurable devices that utilize preformed modules loaded
from off-chip storage. Although this works well for the implementation of custom
processors, it does not address the need for higher security through reconfiguration.
In the next section, methods of dynamic reconfiguration specifically relevant to the
security aspects of dynamic reconfiguration are discussed.
2.3.2 Dynamically Reconfigurable Designs. The DRFPGA field has seen
multiple designs aimed at providing flexible, efficient solutions for users seeking to
perform a range of tasks [12,21,32]. The current designs vary primarily in the method
of reconfiguration rather than the motivation behind the reconfigurable nature of
the devices. Although the designs may not be well suited to reconfiguration for
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protection of circuit design, the methods themselves help to shed light on how dynamic
reconfiguration can be achieved.
Xilinxr is a major player in the FPGA manufacturing field and has a com-
mercial solution for customers seeking to implement a dynamically reconfigurable
platform. As early as 2001, Wu et al. discussed the increasing attention gained by
DRFPGAs and highlighted a Xilinxr approach to reconfiguring the FPGA using
modified Xilinxr XC4000E CLBs [14]. While Wu et al.’s article focuses on an al-
gorithm addressing the complex placement problem for DRFPGAs, it also highlights
an interesting method of implementing the dynamic reconfiguration. When the re-
configuration process is initiated, the values for the current operations are stored in
Micro Registers. The new configuration is stored as a “plane” of Configuration Mem-
ory Cells (CMCs) and is mapped over the existing CLB array. Once the change has
been mapped and implemented, the operations resume using the values stored in the
Micro Registers [14]. This method of reconfiguration has limited use in the security
field due to the need for precompiled CMCs. While it may add a level of complexity
to the progress of reverse-engineering, pattern analysis could reveal the limited num-
ber of CMC planes in use and may provide the attacker with enough information to
accurately predict which planes will be implemented.
Lala and Walker present a very different form of the DRFPGA [29]. This
design is well suited to reliability as opposed to efficiency or security, but the idea can
be applied to other areas. In their implementation, CLBs are grouped together into
“cells.” Each cell contains four CLBs. Three of the CLBs are used much like any other
FPGA to implement specific functions or parts of an overall design. The fourth CLB
is used to replace one of the primaries should that CLB fail. The design is relatively
rudimentary, but does require significant work to perfect the timing and ensure that
routing to/from the CLB is accomplished. Unfortunately, this implementation results
in 33% overhead in unused area since the CLB must be maintained as a spare. In
addition, once a CLB experiences a failure there is no other spare available. There is a
proposed method to arrange the cells in a “super cell” arrangement [29]. This mimics
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the cell arrangement in that there are four cells, one of which serves as a backup for
another cell in case it should fail. Again, the shortfall comes in that the arrangement
will not account for more than one cell failure. Overall the design provides provisions
for minimal reconfiguration, but does not provide an acceptable platform for security
minded reconfiguration needs as the replacement CLBs/Cells are all precompiled.
2.3.3 Dynamic Reconfiguration Challenges. Implementing dynamic recon-
figuration is no trivial task. In addition to the difficulties facing any circuit design
team, one must also consider the changing functionally and physically relationships
between modules. Designers must also accommodate extra space/power requirements
for the reconfiguration overhead. Finally, the reconfiguration itself consumes compu-
tational effort resulting in lost time and space for the primary functional processes.
The penalties associated with reconfiguration circuitry are proportional to the com-
plexity and flexibility of the device. Many researchers have invested time in reducing
the overhead of certain aspects only to increase the cost of others. For example, Jean
et al. discuss reducing the computational time and space overhead by preprocessing
the reconfiguration information with a dedicated Resource Manager (RM) on board
the FPGA while the board is in operation [20]. While this may assist in lowering
the time necessary to implement the new configuration, it comes with the penalty of
increased system complexity and the need for FPGA resources dedicated to the RM.
This design does require the new modules to be statically determined prior to the RM
placing them. The RM does, however, dynamically allocate space for the new mod-
ules. Which reduces the amount of on-board real estate needed for the new processes.
The RM is an example of placing more autonomy in the FPGA processes resulting in
increased flexibility of the design at the expense of additional computing resources.
Placing compilation resources on board (as opposed to using precompiled modules)
can further increase the flexibility and reduce space overhead, but processing time
and system complexity are sacrificed.
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2.4 Polymorphic Reconfiguration
2.4.1 Polymorphic Reconfiguration Overview. The designs discussed thus
far represent dynamic configuration, but are not good examples of polymorphic dy-
namic reconfiguration. They used precompiled blocks that could be substituted for
the current functions as needed. Although some designs exhibited granular reconfig-
uration, they required a precompiled bitstream or bitstream components to overwrite
current functions. Polymorphic circuits, on the other hand, provide reconfiguration
based on an algorithm rather than implementing static precompiled modules. The
computational complexity is greatly increased for polymorphic circuits as compared
with DRFPGAs using precompiled modules, but the resulting design is more flexible
and better suited to security applications. The primary advantages the polymorphic
design has over other DRFPGA designs are granularity and autonomous operation.
Since they implement a design algorithm as opposed to strict static module placement,
they are capable of implementing a wider variation of designs. They also behave more
autonomously since the algorithms typically only require a small set of rules, which
leaves the rest to the processor and FPGA attributes.
Most research designs address polymorphic methods as evolutionary in nature.
Evolutionary methods work at constructing/reconfiguring the FPGA circuit from the
bottom up using a small number of building blocks. This is not consistent with
standard engineering top-down design. The general concept is that designs created
using small functional circuit blocks combined using a low level algorithm provide an
almost natural development process that is largely autonomous. Miller et al. outline
some basic defining characteristics of evolutionary methods, a simpler set of rules,
building blocks, and an “assemble and test” methodology that differentiate them
from more prominent traditional methods of circuit design [23]. Figure 2.6 depicts
an abstract representation of the evolutionary and traditional design ideologies. By
incorporating evolutionary development facets into the reconfiguration scheme, the
overall range of design possibilities increases greatly. Also, by distributing the decision
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making to a high number of low level entities instead of consolidating the directives in
a single high-level location, the target for adversaries is smaller and more disjointed.
Figure 2.6: An abstract diagram highlighting evolutionary (left side) and traditional
(right side) digital circuit design approaches [23].
2.4.2 Polymorphic Reconfigurable FPGA Designs. The polymorphic DRF-
PGA field contains few examples of fully functioning designs. Most research in the
area of polymorphic DRFPGAs focuses on “proof of concept” algorithms or relatively
simple implementations of the algorithms. For example, one of the more prolific pub-
lishers on polymorphic/evolutionary design, Stoica, discusses a planned architecture
that relies on actual transistor level granular reconfiguration for implementation [4].
Reconfiguration is performed at the transistor level where different voltages, temper-
atures, and other environmental values cause the transistors to behave in varying
manners. Gates constructed using these transistors in a Field Programmable Tran-
sistor Array (FPTA) will have different functions depending on the voltage, temper-
ature, etc. For example, an “AND/OR gate” will function as an AND gate at lower
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temperatures (5◦ C) or an OR gate at higher temperatures (90◦ C) [4]. While this
implementation appears to have promising uses in the security field, controlling the
temperature and voltage in a reliable enough manner to prevent accidental miscon-
figuration could prove to be an overwhelming task. The following section covers some
difficulties in the evolutionary circuit field.
2.4.3 Polymorphic Reconfiguration Challenges. While promising in theory,
there are still challenges to the implementation of polymorphic dynamic reconfigura-
tion. The practicality of evolutionary design may be in question when it comes to
large circuits. Stoica et al. found that the efficiency of large designs was not optimal
using the evolutionary model [3]. They theorized that larger circuits could be real-
ized if the complexity of the basic building blocks was increased. Since one of the
factors separating the DRFPGAs from polymorphic FPGAs is the very idea of small
functional units, designers must be careful they do not cross the boundary into the
DRFPGA field, which limits the benefits of implementing the evolutionary design.
Some designs proposed environmental control variables such as temperature or
voltage level. External conditions are not always easily controlled and can pose a
serious threat to the standard operation of the circuit. Given the critical applications
at hand, it is unlikely implementing external controls will provide a format conducive
to the job. In addition to random environmental impacts, using external conditions for
directing the reconfiguration process provides another attack vector for adversaries.
2.4.4 Polymorphic Reconfiguration Summary. As with all technology, FP-
GAs offer great possibilities, but misuse can seriously hinder any operations relying on
the device and result in compromise of sensitive data. As FPGA use becomes more
prevalent for proprietary designs, so does the overall community effort to discover
ways to view/acquire said designs. One possible way of protecting designs imple-
mented on an FPGA is to reconfigure the design, which creates a mobile target for
those seeking to illicitly obtain information from the FPGA. In order to maintain the
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operability of FPGA devices, the reconfiguration must be performed while the device
is in operation – also known as dynamic reconfiguration.
A substantial amount of research has been performed targeting dynamic recon-
figuration for optimization or flexibility of designs, but little has been published on
security-minded reconfiguration. Dynamic reconfiguration presents a valid approach
to protect designs and, in particular, polymorphic dynamic reconfiguration provides a
granular, autonomous method of implementing FPGA design security. The research
in this field is limited, but has provided some promising prospects.
It is important for more research to be performed exploring the possibility of
implementing security designs using polymorphic reconfiguration. While research has
provided promising designs, the shortcomings prevent them from serving as valid
solutions for critical applications. More research must be accomplished to investigate
a controllable polymorphic design capable of protecting proprietary designs from theft
while providing a reliable computing platform.
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III. Research Methodology
The following chapter serves to provide an outline of the implementation andtesting phase for research into dynamic reconfiguration in support of FPGA
security. Each step of the development and test process is provided for understanding
of the actual test results.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis. The goal of this research effort is to secure
FPGA designs against adversarial compromise through the use of polymorphic and
dynamic reconfiguration. For simplicity, further discussions in this thesis will refer
to all reconfiguration methods as dynamic reconfiguration as opposed to separating
the polymorphic and standard dynamic reconfiguration. There are other designs
that incorporate dynamically reconfigurable functionality; however, security is not the
motivation for reconfiguration. In addition, there are serious shortcomings regarding
the granularity of existing reconfiguration methods that limits their effectiveness at
reconfiguration for security.
Research supports the belief that a reconfigurable FPGA will provide significant
protection against reverse-engineering and/or cloning of the device. Even a relatively
simple design from a reconfigurable Xilinxr Virtex4r based FPGA cannot be ob-
tained using the current reverse engineering methods unless the reconfiguration time
is longer than the time necessary to discover the design from the original FPGA. The
most rudimentary exploration technique, black box testing, is not feasible for most
designs found in current systems. For example, to perform an entire black box anal-
ysis on a 32-bit adder would take over 1,000 years. Current architectures commonly
use even larger designs of 64 or even 128 bits. Therefore, black box techniques are
not a primary concern in this research.
The other methods of reverse engineering discussed previously, including pas-
sive power analysis, glitching, and bitstream theft, are addressed through the recon-
figurable platform and algorithm addressed in this chapter.
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3.1.2 Approach. The security of an FPGA is improved using a dynamically
reconfigurable FPGA design. The proposed design performs reconfiguration “on-the-
fly” such that the circuit design implemented on the FPGA is resistant to analysis or
reverse engineering. Reconfiguration is accomplished without external interaction in
the form of user commands or off-chip computational resources. Everything needed to
execute the reconfiguration process is contained within the actual FPGA IC package;
thus, the possibility of malicious interaction with the FPGA design is limited. The
current research effort does not include the full autonomy, but will support future
efforts through autonomous designs requiring modest computational investment on
the part of the external controller.
The reconfiguration process must not only retain all the functionality of the
original circuit and be executed autonomously, but it must also be completed within
a time frame deemed reasonable. This particular time frame is bounded by a value
based on the criticality and size of the target circuit. If a user dictates that a circuit
must operate with no more than 5 ms of downtime, then this value becomes the
upper bound for the reconfiguration time. Although the targeted portion of the
circuit will not be operable during the reconfiguration process, the rest of the circuit
will be capable of operating with limited impact. The limited impact comes in the
form of buffering any inputs/outputs from the targeted portion to other non-targeted
portions.
One half of the solution is the development of a hardware platform supporting
dynamic reconfiguration. Current FPGA designs are limited in granularity and do
not permit the reconfiguration of single CLB s as required for successful execution of
the algorithm above. They also lack autonomy at a low level of operation. A custom
FPGA architecture has been developed to address these shortcomings and support the
reconfiguration process. The custom architecture permits the reconfiguration of any
CLB without reloading or reconfiguring any other CLBs through the use of a custom
designed serial/parallel communication network. The FPGA is also supplemented
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with a similar serial network allowing the system to target any single LUT in the
FPGA for reconfiguration via the reconfiguration algorithm.
The other half of the reconfiguration process is the reconfiguration algorithm.
The algorithm defines the changes in circuit configuration. For this implementation,
the algorithm has two primary avenues for reconfiguration: LUT value inversion and
functional replacement. Through completion of either reconfiguration method, the
actual composition of the circuit can be altered without impacting the operation.
The functional replacement process can also be used to alter the output of the circuit
in a manner that is only predictable to processes or modules that have knowledge of
the new function output configuration through a key. Use of the key will allow an
external process to identify the legitimate and illegitimate output pins for the circuit
as well as to adjust the timing to accommodate changes in the timing.
The Xilinxr Virtex4r includes a PowerPCr microprocessor embedded within
the FPGA design. The design is structured such that the embedded processor is used
to execute the algorithm for reconfiguration using code stored on the FPGA. The effi-
ciency and security of the reconfiguration is improved over an implementation where
the microprocessor executes the algorithm from off-chip. Given time constraints,
the PowerPCr processes are simulated using a manual process of developing the pro-
gramming bitstream. The reconfiguration algorithm and hardware are designed to
implement as much of the functionality as possible at the CLB or LUT level. This
granular autonomy is used to lower the computational overhead of the reconfiguration
process as well as limit the transmission of critical data across data busses within the
FPGA. By limiting the amount of data transmitted to accomplish the reconfigura-
tion, the odds of an adversary successfully tampering with the reconfiguration process
itself are reduced.
After a thorough survey of the DRFPGA field, it became evident that a dif-
ferent approach was needed. The evolutionary algorithm arena provides a manner of
reconfiguration that has not been widely implemented in the FPGA fields. Evolution-
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ary algorithms rely on fine granularity and autonomous cells to simulate biological
processes and remove the constraints of established circuit design procedures. By
implementing the granular, autonomous structure, the reconfiguration algorithm be-
comes truly polymorphic and is limited only by the constraints of the reconfiguration
algorithms. However, the evolutionary algorithms currently in use are not well suited
to obfuscation of code and typically suffer from inefficient time and power usage. By
combining the strengths of granular, autonomous, cellular reconfiguration with selec-
tive and predictable (to authorized parties) obfuscation, an ideal secure platform is
developed.
3.2 Research Boundaries
To evaluate the effectiveness of the DRFPGA, it is imperative that there are
clearly defined boundaries between what is within the scope of the research effort.
As seen in Figure 3.1, the overall System Under Test (SUT) consists of the FPGA
device, software, and the test circuit implemented within the FPGA. This collection
of components constitutes the DRFPGA.
Figure 3.1: Abstract representation of the Reconfigurable FPGA as the SUT.
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The Component Under Test (CUT) of the system is the reconfiguration pro-
cess and support hardware. The DRFPGA is comprised of six primary components:
reconfiguration algorithms, CLBs, configuration network, inversion network, routing
bus, PowerPCr Microprocessor, and the data I/O interface.
Reconfiguration Algorithm This is part of the actual CUT. The reconfiguration
algorithm is executed manually as of the conclusion of this research effort, but
future implementations would be executed autonomously using on-board re-
sources.
CLBs The CLBs make up the primary functional components of the DRFPGA. Each
CLB houses eight LUTs and devices needed to route the LUT input/output to
the routing bus. The circuit functionality is contained within the CLBs.
Configuration Network The configuration bus carries the information necessary
to configure the CLBs. This is separate from the routing bus, which is used for
operational data. The configuration bus also serves to reconfigure the DRFPGA
while it is in operation.
Inversion Network The inversion network allows the targeted inversion of any LUT
within the design. As discussed later in this chapter, the inversion process is
carried out in two stages, both of which are implemented functionally at the LUT
level. The inversion network carries the command from the initiator (PowerPCr
core or manually derived instruction) to the selected LUT.
Routing Bus The routing bus connects CLB inputs and outputs across the DRF-
PGA. The bus is not unique to this platform, but is instead based on the
Xilinxr schematics. This component does not implement the core functional-
ity of the components, but rather the interconnection of CLBs.
PowerPCr Microprocessor The PowerPCr microprocessor is implemented on the
DRFPGA and is used to execute the reconfiguration algorithm using the inver-
sion and reconfiguration networks. The PowerPC microprocessor has not been
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implemented as part of this research effort; therefore, the instructions deliv-
ered through the networks will be compiled manually and programmed into the
networks via VHDL test bench stimulus.
Data I/O Interface The data I/O interface allows inputs to be passed to the circuit
implemented on the FPGA and allows reading of the outputs for the circuit. For
the purpose of this research, inputs are provided via VHDL test bench stimulus.
The outputs are read directly from the VHDL model during simulation.
Outside of the system boundaries and the scope of research is the support hard-
ware such as the computer used to initially program the FPGA, power supply, and
input/output monitoring equipment. Since a VHDL model is being used for the test
runs, the actual FPGA hardware and factors affecting its operation (e.g., tempera-
ture, voltage) are not contained within the scope of this research. In addition to the
components listed within the SUT, there are also parameters and metrics, which are
discussed in their respective sections.
This research effort will not study the actual attributes of the physical im-
plementation of the design except as it applies to the functionality of the circuit,
reconfiguration algorithm, and hardware support for dynamic reconfiguration. The
VHDL model includes the custom architecture design permitting individual CLB ad-
dressing, but will not include the actual PowerPCr processor. The steps taken by the
PowerPCr are simulated using a manual process to develop LUT and reconfiguration
instructions while operating under the constraints of the algorithm. The design of
the DRFPGA is based on the Virtex4r FPGA with added hardware supporting the
individual CLB and LUT addressing methods. For this research effort, the recon-
figuration algorithm is limited to operating on relatively simple circuits. The goal
does not include stress testing the design using large data sets. Typical test circuits
include simple designs such as adders, counters and comparator circuits (specifics are
discussed further in the workload section).
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3.3 System Services
The purpose of the SUT is to implement an original user provided circuit and
provide a secure, reconfigured circuit that is functionally identical to the original, ex-
cept in the case where spatial output obfuscation is desired. With each reconfiguration
operation, the reconfigured portion of the circuit returns to normal operation within
the reconfiguration time overhead (dependant on the circuit implemented). Inputs
are provided to the DRFPGA, processed by its programmed circuit, and provided as
outputs for use or analysis. After reconfiguration, the circuit will either operate as
expected given the reconfiguration and the decoy circuit output routing or the output
will not match. Differing output represents a failure in the reconfiguration process
unless the output differentiation is planned. Failure of the SUT can occur either due
to an incomplete reconfiguration execution (e.g. the algorithm is interrupted) or the
reconfiguration completes, but the result is not functionally equivalent to the origi-
nal circuit. Given the two possible variables (reconfiguration completion and correct
reconfiguration) and the two values per variable (failure or success), there are a total
of four potential outcomes of the process as dictated in Table 3.1. Although the pos-
sibility exists for the reconfiguration to fail and the outputs to match the expected
outputs, this does not represent a successful SUT outcome.
Table 3.1: Potential outcomes of SUT
Output Correct Reconfiguration Succeeds SUT Success
No No No
No Yes No
Yes No No
Yes Yes Yes
3.4 Workload
Given the varied uses of a design and the limited functionality needed at this
time, the workload selected is simple in design and operation as compared to the
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final expected circuits since the goal is to verify the correctness of the reconfiguration
algorithm and the feasibility of the implementation. The workload consists of binary
counters, ripple carry adders (with carry in), and comparators. Specifically, 4-bit and
8-bit versions of the adder and binary counter and an 8-bit variant of the comparator
circuit provide a total of five sample circuits. The 4-bit variants are used to implement
the 8-bit circuits and are not independently evaluated because they are included in
the 8-bit test vectors.
In addition to the circuit inputs supplied to the SUT, there is also the require-
ment for a reconfiguration key. The reconfiguration key determines the pseudo-random
target outputs for the decoy circuits. The key is currently implemented as a seed for
the Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) selecting the reconfiguration target. Fu-
ture implementations will also designate valid and invalid outputs. While the key is
provided as part of the workload for the purpose of evaluation, it will be stored on
the chip for any actual fielding of the DRFPGA.
3.5 Performance Metrics
The SUT is evaluated based on measured performance metrics. The four se-
lected metrics are: power usage, time to reconfigure, area overhead for reconfiguration
logic, and the accuracy of the reconfigured circuit output.
Power Usage The power needed to perform reconfigurations is compared between
the DRFPGA and FPGA. The measurement will capture the power consumed
from the first issuance of the reconfiguration command until the system is ready
to accept its first input signal for the reconfigured circuit. Evaluating this
metric will provide a method of determining whether the implementation of a
reconfigurable platform yields power benefits when compared to the FPGA.
Time to reconfigure After the system performs a task using a sample circuit (e.g.,
an adder) and input, a command is issued to reconfigure the circuit. The time
36
from the first issuance of the reconfiguration command until the system is ready
to accept its first input signal for the reconfigured circuit is called the time to
reconfigure. Reconfiguration time impacts operation since the DRFPGA CLB s
targeted for reconfiguration are not available during the reconfiguration. For
example, if an operation normally takes 100 clock cycles to complete and the
reconfiguration takes five clock cycles, then the operation running on the DRF-
PGA will take 5% more time to execute the operation.
Area overhead for reconfiguration logic The area for an FPGA implementation
with reconfiguration functionality is calculated and compared to a functionally
similar FPGA without the reconfiguration hardware. This metric serves to
highlight the feasibility of the system in limited space/weight applications such
as space vehicles or portable systems.
Accuracy of reconfigured circuit output The non-reconfigured circuit output is
compared to the output of the reconfigured circuit given the same input val-
ues. Given the relatively simple sample circuits chosen, exhaustive tests can
verify that the input is 100% accurate. Accurate circuit output is vital to any
operation.
3.6 Parameters
3.6.1 SUT Parameters. The SUT parameters are variables impacting the
outcome of the dynamic reconfiguration process. The SUT parameters are: available
resources, algorithm iterations, CLB/LUT resolution, maximum routing distance,
time between reconfigurations, and FPGA timing characteristics.
Available resources This parameter describes the size of the FPGA in CLBs. The
number of CLBs limits the maximum size sample circuit that can be imple-
mented.
Algorithm iterations The reconfiguration algorithm is executed iteratively to strengthen
the security for the resulting reconfigured circuit. For the LUT inversion method,
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continual iterations throughout the circuit operation will guarantee a bitstream
that cannot be stolen and implemented on another DRFPGA.
CLB/LUT resolution The reconfiguration resolution refers to the smallest com-
ponent that can be targeted for reconfiguration. The module size targeted for
reconfiguration varies from a single LUT entry to the entire DRFPGA. For
the cases considered in this research, the resolution varies either at the LUT
level(LUT inversion algorithm) or CLB level (functional replacement).
Maximum routing distance Routing signals between CLBs takes time and con-
sumes power. To maintain correct operation, an upper limit must be imposed
on routing lengths between CLBs. This value may be altered for specific ap-
plications. For example, low power applications would require shorter routing
lengths at the cost of less flexible reconfigurations. If security and speed of re-
configuration becomes the goal, the routing lengths can be increased providing
more options when placing CLB components. For the purpose of this research,
the routing distance is across four CLBs. This allows the measurement and
analysis to be focused on the reconfiguration algorithms and hardware aspects
as they are critical to the development of a DRFPGA platform.
Time between reconfigurations The time between reconfigurations is varied to
increase security or to decrease latency in operations. This parameter is not to
be confused with algorithm iterations. For example, if the algorithm iteration
parameter is five, then five iterations of the algorithm are ran successively and
separated by the time between reconfigurations. After waiting for the time be-
tween reconfigurations, five iterative algorithm executions are performed again.
Increasing the time between reconfigurations will allow more operational pro-
cessing to occur at the cost of lower security while decreasing the time will
shorten the analysis opportunities for adversaries seeking to study the circuit
but negatively impact operation processing efficiency.
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FPGA timing characteristics Timing characteristics encompass the delay param-
eters dictating a circuit’s operating speed. The fundamental defining attribute
for timing will be the delay between input and output on combination circuits
(adder and comparator) or the maximum delay between storage elements in
sequential circuits (counter).
3.6.2 Workload parameters.
Sample Circuit CLB usage This is the number of CLBs that are needed to imple-
ment the sample circuit. CLB usage will affect the power needed for the circuit
as well as the time to reconfigure. A larger circuit generally uses more power
and takes more time to reconfigure.
Sample Circuit Routing The connection routing between CLBs for the sample
circuit affects the power usage and reconfiguration time.
Sample Circuit Input Varying the sample circuit input is necessary to verify that
the reconfigured circuit correctly operates. Since the 4-bit sample circuits used
are relatively simple, full factorial input vectors are used to test for correct
operation. The 8-bit variants use a full factorial test for each 4-bit sub-circuit.
The 8-bit circuits have been designed in a modular manner that allows the upper
4-bit circuit to be tested independently of the first four bits as long as the carry
bit from the lower four to the upper four is included in the upper 4-bit module’s
full factorial test.
Reconfiguration Key Length The reconfiguration key is used to initialize the LFSR
selecting the target for reconfiguration. The length of the key affects the secu-
rity and efficiency of the reconfiguration effort. A larger key results in a more
secure circuit by providing more options for the random node placement, but
requires more storage and computation.
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3.7 Factors
Factors provide a way to alter the experiment and find ways to improve the
process or identify potential problems. The following factors are taken from the list
of parameters affecting the SUT and experiments:
Sample Circuit The circuit makeup affects the time to reconfigure different circuits
and can have a significant effect on the process results. The DRFPGA is pro-
grammed with three different types of circuits: binary counters, ripple-carry
adders, and comparators. Each circuit type is implemented in 4-bit and 8-bit
variations except for the comparator. The four basic designs represent common
components of larger systems. By varying the complexity of each circuit type
through the adjustment of the bit width, varying degrees of CLB usage are
evaluated while still retaining an achievable goal of total factorial testing. The
next common input size, 16 bits, will increase the number of test cases for full
factorial testing by a factor of over 65,000 times for the adder and compara-
tor circuits. Diagrams of sample circuits expressed as CLB block diagrams are
located in Appendix D.
Sample Circuit Input Each input circuit is evaluated using every input combina-
tion available. For an 8-bit circuit (the most complex test configuration), there
are 131,072 different input combinations. Given the time required to implement
each of the test vectors, the testing method uses overlap between subsequent
4-bit modules to reduce the number of vectors to 64. Since the counter does
not accept user input aside from the enable and clock signals, the vectors for
its test are relatively simple. The counter is simply allowed to progress from
the initial state (all 0’s) to the final state (all 1’s). This process takes 256 clock
cycles. For all test circuits, the output for every input test is compared with a
known good output to verify accurate operation.
Time between Reconfigurations The reconfigurations are not being run continu-
ously. Otherwise, for the relatively simple designs implemented as test circuits,
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the actual circuit implemented on the DRFPGA would never perform its func-
tion. The time between reconfigurations dictates how much time the circuit
will have to run. Shortening the time between reconfigurations decreases the
target time for adversaries to inspect the DRFPGA hardware/operations as a
static system; however, this also decreases the efficiency of the sample circuit
implemented on the DRFPGA. On the other hand, increasing the time between
operations provides more time for the sample circuit operation and a longer
static target for adversarial inspection and analysis. The time is designated
based on the time needed to successfully map the circuit using black box re-
verse engineering attacks.
3.8 Evaluation Technique
The DRFPGA is evaluated using simulation software on the VHDL model. The
software is relatively straight forward and will not include testing of environmental
variables on the operation of the DRFPGA. The algorithm is developed and tested
for the target FPGA ( Xilinxr Virtex4r ) and will not be modeled for implemen-
tation on other hardware. Each of the three primary circuit variations listed in the
factors section is programmed on the DRFPGA in 4-bit and 8-bit variants, except for
the comparator, which is implemented only in an 8-bit variant. For each circuit pro-
grammed (regardless of whether it is on the DRFPGA or the FPGA), the following
steps are performed:
Program Compile the VHDL model in the simulation software.
Operation Circuit simulation using the test input combinations in a sequential man-
ner. For example, on the 4-bit adder the first run would be 0000 + 0000, for
input A + input B. This input can be viewed as input 00000000, where the first
four bits are input A, the next four input B. The next input is 00000001. In
this manner, the input is varied from all 0’s to all 1’s.
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Power Measurement Simulation software used to measure the maximum power
usage.
Execution Time Execution time is measured for the total run of all inputs.
Output Output values for each input are compared to the output of a known good
circuit. Any discrepancies result in immediate flagging as a failed run and no
further input vectors are executed.
FPGA CLB Count Total area (in CLBs) is documented. The CLB count is pro-
vided by counting the CLBs used in the VHDL model.
Each of the results for a specific circuit will be compared between the initial
circuit and the reconfigured circuit. This will provide values as discussed in the metrics
section.
3.9 Experimental Design
The experimental design mimics a full factorial test. To test the 8-bit circuits,
the circuit is first broken down into two 4-bit circuits with a single signal carrying
from one 4-bit section to the next. Every combination of the first 4-bit circuit is
tested, followed by the second circuit tested in the same manner, except that the carry
signal is simulated to provide the second circuit with every possible signal it could
receive. Every combination of factor values is explored and the results compared.
This provides the means to determine the implications of implementing the DRFPGA
for the selected circuits which, since the circuits selected represent common sub-
components of most real-world circuits, accurately reflect the DRFPGA performance
in fielded applications. The total number of experimental inputs applied per full
factorial run is listed in Table 3.9.
The total estimated time to run each full factorial test on the simulation is based
on an average time of one second per test (measured mean). Therefore, the total test
time given no failures is 37.55 hours.
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Table 3.2: Experimental input counts.
Test Counts per System (DRFPGA/FPGA)
Original Reconfigured Total
8-Bit Adder 1,536 1,536 3,072
8-Bit Counter 512 512 1,024
8-Bit Comparator 65,536 65,536 131,072
Totals 67,584 67,584 135,168
Since the test is conducted as a simulation of a VHDL model, multiple runs will
not be necessary for any given configuration of the SUT. No random variables will be
added to the test runs so the results will be identical from each execution of the full
factorial test to the next unless factors are adjusted. If a failure is found, then that
test must be reaccomplished after fixing existing issues.
3.10 Methodology Summary
This section serves to document the design and experimentation of the DRF-
PGA. The DRFPGA is proposed as a solution for a secure FPGA platform protect-
ing circuit designs from exploitation, theft, and unauthorized duplication. The key
distinguishing factors for a DRFPGA are the reconfiguration algorithm and the hard-
ware network supporting granular reconfiguration. It is important to consider the
parameters affecting the DRFPGA performance before initializing the experimen-
tation process. The reconfiguration algorithms and supporting hardware networks
are the primary foci of experimentation. Other key parameters are the DRFPGA
hardware attributes (e.g. CLB resources and timing characteristics), actual circuits
implemented on the DRFPGA, and the time between reconfigurations. The circuits,
reconfiguration targets, and reconfiguration methods are varied through the experi-
mental design as factors. Through manipulation of the factors, differing results are
found that can be attributed to the adjusted value. Important results include the
time necessary to perform a reconfiguration, the power overhead involved in provid-
ing a reconfigurable system, and the hardware resource (in CLBs) of implementing
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a DRFPGA as compared to the FPGA. The manipulation of the factors results in a
total of 4,286,976 combined test cases for the DRFPGA and FPGA devices.
Overall, implementing this experimental model adequately addresses the need
for evaluation of the DRFPGA device using simulated runs of a VHDL model. Through
analysis of the results, shortfalls are identified and further research directions pro-
vided.
3.11 Custom FPGA Design
The functional requirements of the reconfigurable platform mandate a custom
FPGA design as no design currently exists that supports the granularity of reconfig-
uration needed. The custom design is based on the Xilinxr Virtex4r architecture,
but includes substantially more capabilities in the retiming and reconfiguration arena.
The framework was constructed by Jason Paul in support of his work on retiming FP-
GAs for security [37]. The FPGA was created in two primary phases: one to model
the CLB and data routing functions and the other to implement a programming router
network. The CLB hardware foundation was created by Paul in 2007 as a hardware
platform supporting retiming.
The original design consisted of a 4x4 array of CLBs arranged in an FPGA. For
this research effort the CLB count remains the same, although the overall size (in
area and components) is larger due to the addition of the reconfiguration hardware.
In order to permit precise dynamic reconfiguration, a programming network has been
created and added to the FPGA design to allow the real-time programming of any
single CLB or the entire FPGA.
The FPGA model is constructed in a hierarchical manner allowing the abstrac-
tion of function and data requirements for the modules within the design. The stan-
dard VHDL programming language was selected for the FPGA model based on its
acceptance as an industry standard. Each component has clearly defined functional
requirements as outlined below.
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3.11.1 CLB. The CLBs are used to implement discrete functions within
the FPGA. Multiple CLBs are connected together to create the overall design. For
example, a 4-bit adder can be constructed of four 1-bit adders connected together.
Each 1-bit adder can be implemented in a single CLB. The four CLBs are inter-
connected using the data bus to implement the complete 4-bit adder design. The
CLB structure is based on the CLBs found in the Xilinxr Virtex4r line of FPGAs.
Each individual CLB consists of eight total LUTs capable of implementing custom
functions as well as 32 bits of RAM/ROM storage (configurable as a 32x1-bit or a
16x2-bit memory element), Multiplexors (MUXs), Flip Flops (FFs), and Latches. For
ease of programming and comprehension, the components within the CLB are divided
into four Slices (two M-Slices and two L-Slices). The schematic diagram of a single
CLB is shown Figure 3.2. The CLBs are interconnected through the use of a switch
matrix connecting output and input lines to selected buses in the fabric. The fabric
represents the data network responsible for passing data between different CLB s. It
is important to note the data network is completely separate from the configuration
and LUT inversion networks.
Figure 3.2: VHDL model of a CLB. Each labeled block represents a VHDL sub-
module at the bottom of the hierarchy (i.e. not composed of other sub-modules).
The data and programming networks are omitted for clarity. A schematic view of the
CLB is depicted in Appendix A.
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L-Slice L-Slices contain two 4-input, 16-entry LUTs and the switching hardware
necessary to direct the input and output of the slices. They also contain two
components that can be configured as FF’s or Latches, which are used to im-
plement sequential devices.
M-Slice The M-Slice contains all of the functionality of the L-Slice, but adds memory
functions and the capability to serve as a shift register.
Input/Output Control Module The Input/Output control modules dictate where
the input and output lines are connected for the slices. This should not be con-
fused with the switch matrix or data bus routers as the Control Modules only
direct the information flow within the CLB.
LUT The LUT modules serve to implement the fundamental functions. The reconfig-
uration algorithm is functionally contained within the LUT hardware although
it is not performed unless the instruction is delivered through the LUT inversion
network.
3.11.2 Control Registers. The control registers are used to configure the
FPGA for operation. Each CLB is connected to a single control register. LUT
configuration, data contents, and data directions are all dictated at the configuration
time and based on the contents of the control registers. To program the circuit using
a serial JTAG method, the control registers include a shift-in and shift-out bit that
is used to implement a chain of registers. In addition, the Programming Network is
connected to the control registers allowing dynamic reconfiguration.
3.11.3 FPGA Data Network. The data network is composed of the data
bus (or fabric) and routers. The routers serve to connect certain lines in the data
bus together creating a data path between CLBs. The data routers are configured
during the initial programming stage. The routers serve as the equivalent of a multi
selectable input MUX. Any input to the router can be routed to any output from the
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router. Multiple outputs can be fed from the same input, but to avoid conflicting
signals only one input can drive any output.
3.11.4 CLB Programming Network. The CLB Programming Network is
composed of routers that allow the targeting of individual CLBs for reconfiguration.
It is similar to the data network because it is composed of routers and data lines,
but the actual data line is only one bit wide. Configuration data is streamed to
the target CLB in a serial manner. While this increases the overall configuration
time over a parallel load, it significantly reduces the space/power requirements. The
programming network is further dissected into three primary subcomponents: chain,
channel router, and sub router.
Chain There are a total of 8 chains feeding the configuration data to the CLBs. Each
chain is responsible for 32 CLBs.
Channel Router Each chain has a channel router that directs programming bits to
the components within the chain if the targeted CLB is one of the 32 for which
the chain is responsible. The channel router is also responsible for resetting the
chain components and preparing the sub routers to receive the address for the
target CLB.
Sub Router Every chain has a channel router and eight sub routers. The sub routers
are controlled by the channel router and do not initiate address collection or
start processing the bitstream until told to do so by the channel router. Each
sub router is responsible for four CLBs. Once the target CLB has been identified
via an 8-bit address code, the responsible sub router starts the transfer of data
bits to the CLB control register. While not an actual programming network
component, the control register plays an important part as the final destination
for the programming bits. Once the control register has been programmed with
the necessary bits, the actual CLB configuration takes place.
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To program the CLB array (or any single CLB), the programmer must first
send the address of the target CLB. After sending the address through the input line
of the programming network, the bitstream is transmitted serially to the target CLB
through the network. The CLB can be programmed during runtime, provided the
CLB itself is not in operation or the input sequences are not critical to the overall
circuit function.
3.11.5 LUT Inversion Network. The LUT inversion network is similar in
structure to the FPGA Programming Network. The primary difference is in the
addition of MUXs and registers contained within the CLBs to decode the instructions
and deliver them to the appropriate LUT within the CLB. Since the network is serial
and the LUT and MUX instructions are needed in parallel, the registers store the
data and provide them to the LUT and MUX in a 6-bit wide parallel configuration.
The chains, channel routers, and sub-routers all function the same as the components
from the FPGA Programming Network.
3.11.6 DRFPGA Programming. Standard FPGA designs use a serial JTAG
interface for programming. The serial data line is composed of the control registers
connected in a chain through the FPGA. By using the control registers as shift reg-
isters, the data is clocked into the FPGA as a single bitstream. The custom design
proposed in this research contains the serial programming functionality in addition to
the CLB addressable network previously discussed. The JTAG programming method
results are compared to the CLB addressable network. Of interest in this comparison
are the approximate power usage, area required, and time to reconfigure. The most
critical attribute is the time to reconfigure.
3.12 Reconfiguration Algorithm
The reconfiguration algorithm dictates the process of altering the circuit while
maintaining correct functionality or, in some cases, creating a deterministic method of
obfuscating the output. The process is performed in two different methods: inversion
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and functional replacement. The end product of the inversion method results in a
circuit functionally equivalent to the original circuit. The functional replacement
method may be used to create a functionally equivalent circuit or can provide a
way to redirect inputs/outputs or even change the timing and design of the circuit
completely. In this manner, it is more flexible than the inversion technique, but
requires more time due to reprogramming the entire CLB and is not as autonomous
(i.e. it requires significant work to create the functional replacement modules). Each
step is specialized to operate on FPGA architectures as opposed to Register Transfer
Logic (RTL) schematics. The benefits to this approach are two-fold: less overhead
for processing and increased security.
One of the concerns regarding reconfigurable FPGAs is the added overhead of
the reconfiguration process. The proposed design eliminates a substantial portion
of the overhead involved in reconfiguring a circuit because it does not require the
translation from RTL or designer level functional diagrams to the architecture of the
FPGA. By relating the attributes of the reconfiguration process directly to FPGA
modules and components (i.e. LUTs, FFs, or CLBs) the translation between circuit
schematics to FPGA implementations is omitted. Most reconfigurable architectures
employ a partitioning step similar to Alpert’s use of the Fiduccua-Mattheyses parti-
tioning algorithm [6]. This partitioning consumes a great deal of system resources
and must be performed after every reconfiguration unless the designer maintains a
complete graph representation of the circuit on the FPGA device. Either method
sacrifices limited computational resources and adds complexity to the overall process.
By avoiding the partitioning process altogether, the proposed reconfiguration method
eliminates the performance and time penalties associated with partitioning.
Another concern regarding partitioning of the circuit and/or storage of non-
native representations of the circuit is related to the security of the FPGA architec-
ture. Since there has not been extensive research into the use of reconfiguration for
the security, this problem has not been well addressed. Recall, adversaries may be
able to view the contents of certain memory cells through the use of specialized imag-
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ing equipment. If the schematic of the circuit is stored anywhere on the chip, there
is potential the adversary may acquire a complete schematic of the circuit. Even if
the circuit is not stored permanently at any given time, there are small portions of
the circuit stored for the purpose of reconfiguration and placement that are vulner-
able. This means that the adversary may be able to acquire small portions of the
circuit and, over time, assemble these into a complete overall schematic. These po-
tential pitfalls are avoided altogether through the implementation of a native, organic
reconfiguration algorithm.
3.12.1 LUT Inversion Algorithm. The inversion process is similar to the
bubble pushing concept used in gate level circuit implementations and demonstrated
in Figure 3.3. Although pushing bubbles on the gate level circuit description is
complicated (given the partitioning and translation from the physical implementation
on the actual FPGA), it can be accomplished by focusing on altering the bubble
pushing idea to pertain to the LUTs. For example, the function F = (A+B) · (C ·D)
can be implemented gate-wise as seen in Figure 3.3 Schematic 1.
Figure 3.3: Simple demonstration of the bubble pushing concept on a gate level
circuit schematic. The circuits in Schematic 1 and Schematic 2 both behave identically
in spite of their different structures.
The circuit is reconfigured by pushing the bubbles, creating inverters on the
outputs of gates and on the inputs on the following gates, and converting them to
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equivalent gates. The same circuit after pushing the bubbles is shown in Figure 3.3
Schematic 2. While the circuits are schematically different (reconfigured), they both
will produce identical outputs for any given input combination.
The same concept can be applied to LUTs within a CLB or FPGA. The LUTs
are treated like gates, but with a specialized set of rules. LUTs can be thought of
as a RAM module storing bits in certain addresses accessed through the inputs. The
first step in pushing bubbles in the LUT process involves inverting the values in the
LUT, which equates to inverting the output on a gate. Then, select entries in the
LUTs connected to the output of the inverted LUT are exchanged. The results of
a LUT inversion process are shown in Figure 3.4. As in the gate-wise implementa-
tion, Schematic 1 represents the circuit before reconfiguration and Schematic 2 is a
functionally identical circuit post-reconfiguration.
Figure 3.4: Simple demonstration of the pushing bubbles concept as applied to the
LUT schematic. The circuits in Schematic 1 and Schematic 2 both behave identically
in spite of their different LUT contents.
The manual algorithm for inverting LUTs is more complicated than the basic
gate method, but the hardware implementation is significantly easier with the au-
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tonomous LUTs created for this research and the algorithm’s compatibility with the
LUT hardware attributes. Any gate level circuit can be translated to the LUT realm
as long as no single gate has more inputs than the LUTs. For example, if a schematic
has only 2-input gates, then the circuit can be translated to a LUT circuit completely
composed of the 2-input, 4-entry LUTs found in Figure 3.4. In the example, all of the
LUT contents were inverted. This is not always the case and only single LUTs are
inverted at any given time for the actual reconfiguration. This takes advantage of the
flexibility of the LUT as compared to gates. If only one of the gates feeding the out-
put OR gate in Figure 3.3 Schematic 1 were inverted, then the OR gate itself could
not be translated to an equivalent gate. LUTs, however, provide additional rules
and flexibility that permit single LUTs to be inverted. The operation is governed
by a unique set of rules developed for this research effort. Although other sources
have performed LUT inversion [39], there are no step-by-step algorithms available for
performing single LUT inversions followed by subsequent connected LUT reconfigu-
rations to account for the inverted values. A LUT specific equivalent of the bubble
pushing algorithm applied to the circuit shown in Figure 3.3 is depicted in Figure 3.4.
A more detailed description of the process is demonstrated in Appendix C.
To further strengthen the obfuscation of the circuit, stages for different recon-
figurations can be overlapped. For example, while one LUT system (one LUT output
feeding multiple LUT inputs) is in stage one of the inversion process another unre-
lated LUT is in stage two. Given the current components, this configuration would
require either two parallel inversion networks or the FPGA would be segmented into
two different regions administered by separate inversion networks.
By performing the inversion steps in an overlapping manner, the circuit bit-
stream in its entirety would never be correct. The actual bitstream of the LUT
system is incorrect because of the initial inversion of the first stage. It is not until the
completion of stage two that correct operation is maintained. With this method of
reconfiguration, any static adversarial capture of the entire FPGA bitstream would
result in an incorrectly functioning circuit.
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3.12.2 Functional Replacement Algorithm. The DRFPGA has, in addition
to the LUT inversion method of obfuscation, the capability to perform functional
replacement. This method of obfuscation is similar to other functional unit reconfig-
uration such as Lodi et. al.’s VLIW FPGA [7]. The primary difference is replacement
modules, which are constructed in real-time from a library of sub-modules stored on
the chip. While the hardware for reprogramming modules is completely functional as
of this research effort, the actual library of sub modules and the module identification
method specifics are an area of future study. This research effort serves to outline the
fundamental process and provide a roadmap for implementation.
In future research, the functional replacement algorithm is performed by the
on-board PowerPC processor executing a semi-intelligent method of module identifi-
cation, decomposition, and recomposition. The process can be used to create func-
tionally equivalent circuits similar to the bubble pushing algorithm described for RTL
circuits, or can actually be used to obfuscate the circuit via output/input relocation
and retiming. The following sections outline the fundamental process and provide
examples of how specific circuits can be replaced with functional equivalent circuits
and obfuscated circuits.
The functional replacement algorithm is a top-level outline of a method for
replacing functional systems with new systems. The granularity of the system may
be as small as a single CLB or may contain the entire FPGA. Likely the upper limit for
the granularity will be the computational overhead and time penalty imposed through
the reconfiguration. There are two primary categories of replacement: functionally
identical replacement and obfuscated replacement.
Functionally Identical Replacement The system selected for replacement is re-
placed with a system that will produce the exact same output for any input as
the original system. In addition, the timing of the replacement system must be
the same. Although the overall timing is identical, timing within the system
may be adjusted. For example, assume that the original system can be decom-
53
posed into sub-module-A and sub-module-B with the output of sub-module-A
feeding the input of sub-module-B. Sub-module-A may be sequential and re-
quire one clock cycle to latch the data onto the output while sub-module-B is
combinational and provides the output within a clock cycle. A functionally iden-
tical system could consist of two modules in a similar configuration, but with a
combinational sub module feeding a sequential sub module. Although the tim-
ing within the system has been altered, the change is completely transparent
from the system’s external inputs/outputs; thus, the systems are functionally
identical when considered as a black box system.
Obfuscated Replacement Circuit details can be further secured using temporal
and spatial obfuscation. Temporal obfuscation is achieved using retiming as
in Paul’s research effort [37]. Using temporal obfuscation, the output timing
is altered by changing the overall clock cycles required to process the input
and provide an accurate output. For example, if an adder is implemented as
a combinational circuit then the output for any given input is available within
one clock cycle. By inserting delays via FFs, the output is shifted temporally
by at least one clock cycle. Any adversary attempting to analyze the results
would not know when the correct output is available without a comprehensive
understanding of the reconfiguration process. Spatial obfuscation is similar, but
the output is placed on different physical pins as opposed to being shifted in
time. This serves the same purpose as an adversary would not be aware of which
pins contain the appropriate output (or what order the pins should be read in)
without a comprehensive understanding and insider information.
In order to explain the abstraction of functional replacement, certain attributes
of the overarching design must be identified and defined. The following attributes will
be referred to throughout the process description:
Target System For the purpose of describing the abstract replacement process, the
target system refers to the collective group of components that will be replaced.
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This includes all of the components necessary to implement the function selected
for replacement. For example, in the case of FPGA system replacement, the
system would include the CLBs, routers, data lines, and input output lines.
Sub-module A sub-module is a system identified by its input/output relationship.
Examples of sub-modules applicable to the functional replacement algorithm
may be adders, multipliers, or even simple gates. The size of a sub-module
depends on its function and can vary from granular (i.e. an AND gate) to coarse
(i.e. a binary divider) depending on the function. The key is that multiple sub-
modules may be schematically different, but still implement the same function.
This idea is critical functional replacement.
Library The library consists of all available, precompiled sub-modules. Each sub-
module is identified by its input/output width, timing, size, and function. For
example, an XOR gate may be identified as having a 4-bit input/1-bit output,
combinational (timing of zero clock cycles), 1-LUT (or CLB depending on cho-
sen granularity) configuration. Functionally, this sub-module could be replaced
with any 4-bit input/1-bit output, combinational XOR gate regardless of size.
It could also be replaced with a sequential (as opposed to combinational) con-
figuration to effectively retime the circuit; however, this would have to be taken
into account at the external output. The library contains multiple instances
of functionally equivalent sub-modules for replacement as well as sub-modules
that are slightly different in spacial or timing characteristics such that the re-
placement can be functionally equivalent or may provide a temporal or spacial
offset for the purpose of obfuscation or optimization.
Both categories of replacement follow the same algorithm structure. The al-
gorithm is described in an abstract sense in the following stages: system boundary
identification, system decomposition, sub-module replacement, system recomposition,
reconfiguration. The definitions of each step are described below:
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System Boundary Identification Initially, the system chosen for replacement must
be defined. The granularity of the selection can be defined as a single LUT or
entire DRFPGA. The size of the system will affect the time necessary to accom-
plish the replacement itself. In identifying the system, the inputs and outputs
must be listed. If the replacement is functionally identical, then the inputs and
outputs of the final reconfiguration must match identically to the current con-
figuration. For obfuscated replacement, the inputs and outputs may not match
functionally, but each external connection must be connected to an internal
function to prevent a complete failure of the entire device.
System Decomposition The system, as identified in the first stage of the replace-
ment process, must be broken down into sub-modules that can be compared to
the library modules. The size and configuration of the modules are determined
by the library contents.
Sub-Module Replacement The library contains multiple instances of each sub-
module that are functionally equivalent. In addition, there may be spatially
or temporally obfuscated circuit representations. The equivalent sub-modules
will provide identical output for the entire input space, but will accomplish the
execution in a different manner.
System Recomposition After selecting the sub-modules for replacement, the tar-
geted system must be reassembled to match the overall external input and
output configuration of the original circuit.
System Reconfiguration Once the targeted system has been reassembled, the en-
tire system is stored in the FPGA. The reconfiguration takes place one CLB
at a time. To minimize the impact, the reconfiguration should start with the
lowest numbered CLBs (as arranged in a levelized manner).
3.12.3 Obfuscation Mask. Obfuscated replacement differs from functional
only replacement primarily in the addition of a mask designating the correct output
locations (spatial obfuscation) or timing (temporal obfuscation). The mask must be
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known to the program receiving the reconfigured circuit outputs. The specifics of mask
design are not within the scope of this research, although the functional replacement
example does demonstrate spatial obfuscation for the purpose of security. The mask
itself is a static representation of the reconfiguration algorithm starting point and is
dependant on the reconfiguration key. The DRFPGA and external interface systems
must be synchronized such that legitimate systems interacting with the DRFPGA can
predict the current input and output locations. The mask does not serve to simply
block the incoming or outgoing signals, but redirects data targets (input side of the
DRFPGA) or sources (output side of the DRFPGA) for proper operation.
The obfuscation mask was not developed for the examples in this research be-
cause of the limited output lines. The mask is an essential part of reconfiguration for
more complicated designs.
3.13 Summary
The DRFPGA SUT was tested in accordance with the specified workload pa-
rameters, factors, and metrics. Both the functional replacement and LUT inversion
methods of reconfiguration are evaluated for functional accuracy and efficiency pa-
rameters. Three 8-bit test circuits were constructed for the DRFPGA: ripple carry
adder, counter, and comparator.
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IV. Test Process and Results
This chapter describes the details of the test implementations and results. Thetest details are provided for both the inversion and functional replacement tech-
niques. After reconfiguring the circuit, the altered circuit is tested for correct opera-
tion.
4.1 Test Circuits
4.1.1 Test Circuit Overview. A variety of test circuits are used to demon-
strate the effectiveness of reconfiguration and to measure the penalty in performance
and power usage associated with the reconfiguration process. Given the intense man-
ual cost of implementing the individual circuits, the test circuits are limited to rela-
tively simple devices that might be used in the construction of larger, more complex
systems. Each test circuit has been implemented in 4-bit and 8-bit variations ex-
cept for the comparator circuit, which is implemented in an 8-bit variant only. The
functionality for the circuits is contained within the CLB LUTs. Generalized LUT
content for each circuit can be found in Appendix C. An overview of the test circuits
is provided below:
Adder The adder circuit accepts two binary numbers as input and provides two
output values: the sum value and the carry out value. An 8-bit adder was
developed for this research using two 4-bit adders.
Counter The counter circuit accepts an enable input and a clock input and provides
a binary number as output. As long as the enable input is 1, the counter
will increment the binary number output. Once the binary output reaches the
maximum value possible (all bits = 1) it will restart from the zero state (all bits
= 0).
Comparator The comparator circuit accepts two binary numbers as input and pro-
vides a single bit output. The output is 1 if the two input numbers are identical
else it is 0.
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In addition to implementing the functional attributes of the test circuits in
LUTs within the FPGA, the routing between different functions is created to main-
tain proper operation. The functional LUT schematics can be found in Appendix D.
Understanding the way the modules interact with each other is as important as under-
standing the actual functions of the modules themselves. All data routing is carried
out over the data routing network as previously discussed.
4.1.2 Test Circuit Creation. Designing test circuits for implementation on
the DRFPGA is significantly different from the design using standard methods such
as RTL or VHDL. Since the DRFPGA uses proprietary hardware to implement the
functions, all designs must be tailored to the DRFPGA layout. The functionality of
the test circuits is implemented in the DRFPGA LUTs. As discussed previously, the
LUTs can implement any binary combinational 4-input, 1-output digital operation.
Although the LUT itself operates asynchronously, synchronous functions can also be
implemented using the flip flops and latches within the CLBs.
Routing signals between functional elements is performed via CLB internal rout-
ing hardware. The RTL schematic for a single CLB can be found in Appendix A.
Once data exits the CLB, the routing is up to the routing network discussed in Chap-
ter 3. The routing network permits any single CLB to provide input or accept output
from any other CLB, although there are limits on how many CLBs may communicate
across the routers due to limited physical busses. Due to the fact that the DRFPGA
is implemented as a VHDL model, limitations on the physical travel of signals across
the data network are non existent.
4.1.3 Adder. A common component in a wide variety of digital systems is
the binary adder. The adders used in this research are ripple carry adders, which
significantly reduces design and debug time. The adder function implemented in this
research takes three inputs (A, B and CIN) and provides two outputs (SUM and
COUT ). The functionality of the adder is contained within the LUTs (four bits per
CLB); for each bit of the adder one LUT output is used to compute the SUM result
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while the other is used for the COUT result. The SUM output is provided using the
G-LUT whereas the COUT is implemented in the F-LUT in the same slice. Each slice
implements one full adder, accepting three 1-bit values and providing a 2-bit output.
The configuration of single bit adders connected in a multiple bit arrangement is
depicted in Figure 4.1. Both 4-bit and 8-bit adders were built for this research.
The 4-bit adder consumes one CLB while the 8-bit uses two (being two 4-bit adders
chained together). Only the 8-bit adder is explicitly addressed in the testing and
reconfiguration phase as the 4-bit adder is included in the 8-bit adder test.
Figure 4.1: Functional configuration diagram for n bit ripple carry adder. Each 1
bit adder is capable of functioning independently, but can be chained together with
other 1 bit adders to create a 2, 3, or n-bit adder. Each 1 bit adder is implemented in
a single slice with one LUT providing the SUM output and the other providing the
COUT output.
4.1.4 Counter. Binary counters represent another fundamental component
of digital systems. The counters store a state representing their current count or value.
The counters implemented for this research are 4-bit or 8-bit up counters. With each
clock cycle, the counter implements its value sequentially. Once the stored value has
reached is maximum value (all 1’s) the counter starts from all 0’s and repeats the
process. In addition to the clock input, the counters also have an enable signal that
can either instruct the counter to increment the value (enable = 1) or hold the current
value (enable = 0) and a reset signal that instructs the counter to return to an all
0 state. Similar to the adder, each CLB implements four bits of the counter. In its
simplest design, each bit (x) in an n-bit counter must consider the previous values
to determine what value it must assume on the next clock cycle. For example, bit
three must consider the values for bits zero, one, two, and three to determine what
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the next value should be. Given the limited inputs available on the CLBs, this design
functions in a manner similar to the ripple carry adder by generating a signal for
each bit indicating the values of all the previous bits. The current bit will only toggle
if every previous bit is 1; therefore, there is a signal passed through the bits that
indicates if every previous bit is 1. The configuration of the counter is graphically
represented in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Functional configuration diagram for n-bit counter. Each 1 bit counter
is capable of functioning independently, but can be chained together with other 1-bit
counters to create a 2, 3, or n-bit counter. Each 1-bit counter is implemented in a
single slice with one LUT providing the COUNT output for that bit and the other
providing the All 1 output for the current bit. The All 1 output is high if the current
bit and all the previous bits are 1. This indicates that the next bit should toggle
at the next clock cycle. The final n-1 All 1 signal is not used unless the counter is
chained to another counter to make a larger unit.
4.1.5 Comparator. Comparators provide a means to determine the rela-
tionship between two binary numbers, i.e. A < B,A > B, or A = B. For this
research effort, a simple comparator was constructed to determine whether two bi-
nary numbers are identical. The circuit is implemented in two different configurations
to demonstrate the use of functional replacement. In both configurations, the com-
parator function is broken down into two stages. In the first stage, input bits are
compared to one another and the result of comparing the bits (1 for a match 0 for
different values) are passed to the second stage. The second stage compares the re-
sults from the first stage and, if any first stage results are 0 indicating a difference
in value, then the result of the entire comparison is 0 since at least one of the bits is
different. Functionally, the first stage can be viewed as a set of XNORs comparing
the input values while the second stage is equivalent to an AND gate ensuring that
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all bits for both n-bit input values match (Ax = Bx: 0 ≤ x < n). For clarification on
the gate level implementation, see Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Gate level implementation a simple 2-bit binary comparator. The
output reflects whether the inputs, A and B, are identical. The output will be 1 for
identical inputs or 0 otherwise.
The implementation of the first comparator design within the actual FPGA is
constructed such that the stage one functionality (XNORs) are contained in a single
CLB while the second stage (ANDs) is contained in a second CLB. Each LUT in the
first stage CLB compares two pairs of bits and outputs two values representing each
pair’s successful or failed match. For example, the first slice takes A0, B0, A1, B1 as
inputs and provides two values, A0 = B0 and A1 = B1 as outputs through the two
LUTs contained in the slice. The outputs are 1 if the values match and 0 otherwise.
These output values are fed into the second stage. The second stage is performed in
two steps. The first two slices in the second CLB (M0 and M1) each compare the
outputs from four of the eight match tests computed in the first CLB. The second
two slices in the second CLB (L0 and L1) compare the results from the first Slices
M0 and M1 in a hierarchical manner using an AND gate functionality to determine
whether all inputs matched. An example of the CLB/LUT schematic is shown in
Figure D.3 in Appendix D. The hierarchical relationship between the different stages
in a functional diagram are shown in Figure 4.4.
The second comparator design is constructed such that the stage one and stage
two functionality are both contained in a single CLB. The first two slices (M0 and
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M1) compare four pairs each (for a total of eight pairs needed for the comparator).
For example, Slice M0 takes A0, B0, A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3 as inputs and outputs two
values. (A0 = B0) · (A1 = B1) and (A2 = B2) · (A3 = B3). The outputs are 1 if the
values match and 0 otherwise. These output values are fed into the second stage. The
second stage compares the results from the first stage using an AND gate functionality
to determine whether all inputs matched. An example of the CLB/LUT schematic
is shown in Figure D.4 in Appendix D. The hierarchical relationship between the
different stages in a functional diagram are shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Functional diagram demonstrating the hierarchical structure of a bi-
nary comparator. The example has single bit comparators in the first stage, matching
the equivalent layout of the first comparator configuration. The second, functional
replacement configuration contains the equivalent of 2-bit comparators, thus combin-
ing the functionality of two LUTs from the original design into a single LUT. Both
implementations use 4-bit AND gate equivalents in the second stage, but due to the
differences in output lines, the original implementation has three levels of ANDs in
Stage 2 as compared to a single level for the functional replacement.
4.2 Reconfiguration
4.2.1 Reconfiguration Overview. The test circuit bitstreams are imple-
mented on the VHDL model DRFPGA and tested for correct operation. Each test
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bench compares the results from the FPGA implementation with the results of a
similar function implemented behaviorally. Given the large number of test cases as
described in Chapter 3, the tests were ran using the assert function. The assert func-
tion allows the test to be automated and informs the tester of any input combinations
that triggered an incorrect or unexpected output.
Once the original circuit is shown to be operating correctly, the reconfiguration
process must be tested for every circuit. LUT inversion reconfiguration is performed
on the adder and counter test circuits and functional replacement test reconfiguration
is conducted on the comparator circuit.
The LUT inversion tests are relatively straight forward. A pseudo-random al-
gorithm, implemented as an XNOR LFSR, is used to randomly select single LUTs to
invert. While the current FPGA is 16 CLBs and 128 LUTs in size, the LFSR used
provides a 10-bit pseudo-random number. For the adder and counter circuits, each
having 16 LUTs, the target is selected by using the lower four bits of the 10-bit value.
Once the target address has been generated, the initial inversion is performed on the
selected LUT. Following the initial inversion, the selective segment swapping (Phase
2) is executed to complete the overall LUT inversion process. Once the entire process
has been completed, the output results are evaluated to ensure the circuit is correctly
operating.
The functional replacement tests replace the original functional units with an
alternate implementation. For example, the comparator circuit has two implemen-
tations that are identical in function, but different in design. The original circuit is
reconfigured to implement the second, functional replacement design. This simulates
the substitution of a module from the library of modules for replacement. Since the
target functional circuit may vary widely in size, the selection process is different
from that used in the LUT inversion. The circuit boundaries are determined manu-
ally, and a suitable replacement bitstream is programmed into the FPGA to simulate
an autonomous design. The replacement module for the comparator is precompiled.
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4.2.2 Adder Reconfiguration. The LUT inversion test for the adder com-
pleted successfully. The initial step is selection of a random (or pseudo random) LUT
to initiate the process. As explained in Chapter 3, each LUT relying on the initial
LUT’s output will then have selected segments of its contents swapped with neigh-
boring segments. Details on the LUT inversion process are shown in Appendix B.
The original circuit was given five test cases to demonstrate the operation. A full test
is not required at this point as the circuit was tested for correct operation previously.
Once the five test cases had been presented, the circuit was reconfigured. The LFSR
provided a pseudo-random binary number of “0101” indicating a selection of LUT-5.
LUT-5 is the F-LUT contained in Slice L0 used to compute the COUT value for bit-2.
For clarification, see Figure D.1. This represents the LUT that will be completely
inverted as stated for the Stage 1 actions. Once the initial LUT was inverted, the cir-
cuit outputs are incorrect until the second stage has been completed. This attribute
provides the basis for the phased defense discussed in Chapter 5. Because the COUT
value for bit-2 impacts the values for bits 3-7, an incorrect value will adversely affect
the adder output on all subsequent bits.
Once the initial inversion has been performed, the LUTs relying on the LUT-5
output must be located and inverted with respect to the rules outlined in the LUT
inversion algorithm. LUT-5’s output is connected to the inputs of two different LUTs:
LUT-6 (Slice L1 G) and LUT-7 (Slice L1 F). The output is connected to input-3 on
both LUTs so the Stage 2 LUT inversion performs a swap of the first eight (23)
bits for the second eight. For example, if the contents of the LUT before inversion
were “00110110 11101110”, the resulting contents would be “11101110 00110110”.
Following Stage 2 completion, the circuit returns to normal operation.
The entire reconfiguration process took 69 clock cycles from when the inversion
LUT network was initialized to when the final LUT was inverted and the correct
output was available. For reference, it takes a total of 640 clock cycles to reprogram
a CLB using the CLB programming network and a total of over 2500 clock cycles
using a serial JTAG interface with a column size of four. Although the LUT inversion
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reconfiguration process took 69 clock cycles, the circuit was correctly operating for
the initial 23 clock cycles because these are used to address the initial LUT inversion
target for Stage 1 and no reconfiguration takes place until the target has been found
and the command issued.
4.2.3 Counter Reconfiguration. The LUT inversion test for the counter
completed successfully. The counter was enabled and allowed to count to 64 as a
demonstration of the correct operation. Following the operational phase, the initial
LUT for inversion was selected using the four bits from the LFSR, just as in the adder
reconfiguration test. Since the same seed is used on the LFSR, this test would target
the same LUT if the LFSR was allowed to run the same length of time as the adder
LFSR. Therefore, the LFSR in the test was allowed to run for an additional two clock
cycles to develop a different number. The target was “0111” or LUT-7 (LUT-F in
Slice L1). The schematic of the circuit for identification of the appropriate LUT is
shown in Figure D.2. As with the adder, the output of the circuit will be incorrect
until the final stage of the LUT inversion is complete.
The configuration for the counter is similar to the adder because the initial
target LUT’s output is connected to two other LUT inputs. The major difference is
the sequential characteristics of the circuit. The adder is combinational; therefore,
the output is solely dependant on the inputs. The counter output is dependant on
the inputs and the current values stored in the FFs. For example, with an input
of en = 1 and reset = 0 the output can either be 0 (if the current value is 255) or
current output + 1. This plays an important part in the determination of how the
reconfiguration must be accomplished. If the reconfiguration is performed while the
circuit is in operation (i.e. en = 1 and reset = 0), the count will be disrupted and
the output will be unpredictable. Following the initial inversion, the output values
are seemingly random. Once the reconfiguration process is complete, the count will
resume correctly, but from whatever value was currently stored during the sporadic
operation. To remedy the situation, the count was halted (en = 0) for the entire
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reconfiguration process and resumed once the process was completed. The issues
related to continuous operation during the reconfiguration process are depicted in
Figure 4.5, while Figure 4.6 demonstrates proper operation of the circuit during the
reconfiguration.
Figure 4.5: Demonstration of the counter output errors due to operation of the
circuit during the reconfiguration process. The count value after 87 is a seemingly
random value based on the inverted initial target LUT. The output will continue to
be incorrect until the reconfiguration process is complete, at which time it will count
correctly from whatever value it happens to be when the reconfiguration is complete.
Figure 4.6: Demonstration of the proper method to reconfigure a sequential circuit.
The circuit is halted for the duration of the reconfiguration process. Because the LUT
inversion does not affect the storage elements (i.e. flip flops), the current value will not
change due to the reconfiguration. Once the reconfiguration is complete, the circuit
resumes standard operation.
The timing specifications for the counter circuit are identical to the adder given
the similar relationship between the target LUTs and the LUTs relying on the target
LUT output. The process takes a total of 69 clock cycles, with the first 23 not
impacting operation. Although the counter only had to be disabled for 46 clock cycles,
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it was disabled for the entire 69 clock cycles to clearly demonstrate the reconfiguration
process.
4.2.4 Comparator Reconfiguration. The comparator circuit differs from the
other two designs because the method used to reconfigure the circuit is the functional
replacement method, as opposed to the LUT inversion process used for the adder
and counter. The functional replacement reconfiguration completed successfully with
the final circuit operating as expected. For the purpose of functional replacement,
two schematically different, but functionally equivalent circuits were designed. Each
design accepts two 8-bit numbers and provides a 1 as output if the two numbers are
identical else the output is 0. The initial design is larger than the second and uses
different pins for input and output.
The first step in performing functional replacement reconfiguration is to locate
the boundary of the function to be replaced. In this case, the boundary includes
CLB-0 and CLB-1. The replacement design will occupy CLB-0 only and will not use
CLB-1 pins for output. Due to the shorter chain of LUTs for the input to output
travel, the results of the replacement improve the performance and provide output
obfuscation for security. The second design occupies less area and has less delay
than the original given a shorter data path. For security, the second design relocates
the output value consistent with spatial obfuscation. In this manner, any adversary
observing the output in a black box attack or general analysis would not receive the
correct output values following the reconfiguration. Any authorized system would
need to have knowledge of the inner workings and original circuit to anticipate the
output obfuscation.
4.3 Test Results
4.3.1 Test Results Overview. Every test completed successfully with regards
to correct circuit operation. In addition to ensuring that the reconfiguration does not
adversely affect the correct operation of the circuit, the affect of reconfiguration on
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circuit operation efficiency must be considered. The test circuits operate with a
negligible impact due to reconfiguration time overhead. The two circuits reconfigured
using the LUT Inversion method realized a 13.48% and .5284% loss in operational
efficiency for the adder and counter circuits respectively. Discrepancies between the
two circuits are due to the reduced time between reconfigurations for the counter
circuit. The functional replacement process resulted in increased performance due to
the consolidation of Comparator circuit functions.
The DRFPGA performed favorably when compared to the serial JTAG method
of reconfiguration implemented in conventional FPGA. The LUT inversion process
imposed the lowest penalties in time and power costs for reconfiguring circuits. This
is because the LUT inversion requires transmission of only 23 bits of data as opposed to
626 bits for the functional replacement method. The functional replacement method,
on the other hand, displayed lower penalties in power and speed than the JTAG
implementation when performing reconfigurations consistent with security DRFPGA
operations. It should be noted that the JTAG method is more efficient in power
and time for any CLB count that is a multiple of four because it does not incur the
addressing overhead of the functional replacement method. This value would change
for future, larger implementations of the DRFPGA to further favor the functional
replacement method over the JTAG due to a courser JTAG resolution for larger
FPGAs.
The addition of the functional replacement and LUT inversion hardware imposes
an area increase of less than 6%. This represents a negligible increase considering the
added functionality. A DRFPGA identical in size to a conventional FPGA with 60,000
CLBs would have 55,000 CLBs for operational functions.
4.3.2 Circuit Operation and Performance. Each circuit was tested in two
variations: pre and post reconfiguration. The initial and reconfiguration programming
was performed using the CLB addressable network. Each circuit is strictly diagramed
to provide an accurate portrayal of which individual FPGA components are used. This
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information dictates the delay and speed attributes of the circuit. All attributes were
derived using the Cadencer software suite. The longest path through the configured
circuit was determined and every component along the path is included in the results.
Because the FPGA allows loop-back connections, the software must be specifically
directed on which components are under analysis. These components are evaluated
individually and the results combined for the final value.
In addition to measuring the performance of the circuit itself, it is also necessary
to decide on the time between reconfigurations. The time for the adder is decided
by taking the maximum amount of time to discover the functionality and dividing it
by 10. This equates to reconfiguring the circuit one tenth of the way through any
black box analysis attack. The sequential circuit is significantly more complicated to
determine given a black box approach. For each possible combination (256 total) of
FF values, testing all possible input values is imperative. For the sequential circuit,
the time between reconfigurations is reduced to half of the total time to evaluate.
This equates to reconfiguring the circuit halfway through the black box test. Finally,
for the comparator circuit, the reconfiguration takes almost 100 times the clock cycles
that the LUT inversion needs due to the need for bitstream transmission. Therefore,
the time is half of the total time to discover the circuit.
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The final values indicate the LUT inversion process does not significantly impact
the system performance. Performance of the LUT inversion algorithm, however, does
impact the system as seen in the adder and counter operations per second values.
This is to be expected as alterations to the LUT contents will not add or subtract
from the components necessary in the data path, but any process taking clock cycles
from the primary operation will affect the overall performance. The primary use
of the LUT inversion is to provide a means of obfuscation of the circuit bitstream.
Additionally, the LUT inversion may be used in conjunction with LUT merging and
splitting algorithms to provide an evolutionary basis for system improvement. The
performance and capabilities of the LUT inversion algorithm meet the expectations
for this research effort. Because the LUT inversion process actually modifies the
LUT contents and bitstream, it also defends against readback or bitstream theft
vulnerabilities if the implementation is phased. If the first phase of a LUT inversion
is in operation while the second phase is in operation elsewhere in the circuit, then
the overall result is a bitstream that will not operate correctly without the exact
reconfiguration settings of the original circuit.
The functional replacement process impacts both the security stance and per-
formance of the circuit. In this example, the replacement circuit design is both faster
and requires a smaller area than the original design. The replacement circuit oc-
cupies less than half (42.8%) of the original design area. It is important to note
that even with the recurring reconfiguration, the overall performance in operations
per second is increased. In addition to saving space and time, the new design also
increases the security of the circuit by disguising the operation through spatial ob-
fuscation of the output. The initial design had the correct output on bit 20, bus
row0 CLB1 BUS 1 OUT. This was changed to bit 16 bus row0 BUS 0 OUT on the
reconfigured circuit. Not only is the valid data output relocated, but the original
output location now provides incorrect data. In this respect, the reconfiguration has
relocated the output (spatial obfuscation) and created a decoy circuit that will not
match the function output.
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4.3.3 DRFPGA Programming Network Performance. One of the key fea-
tures to consider regarding the implementation of additional hardware is the cost or
gain in power, area, and speed over the original design. The Cadencer software suite
was used to simulate the design fabrication given 90 nm technology so a new reconfig-
urable design can be conservatively compared to the original hardware. Two different
power attributes are measured: active and passive. The active power measurement
seeks to identify the power usage while the system is being (re)configured while the
passive measures the power leakage from the additional hardware during circuit oper-
ation, but not being configured or reconfigured. The speed of the device is measured
by taking the inverse of the maximum delay for a signal to travel from an input to an
output. In addition to the delay measurement, speed is also determined by the total
amount of steps necessary to perform a desired function. The area will be measured
as the difference or ratio of the original FPGA area and the DRFPGA area.
4.3.3.1 DRFPGA Power Usage. For the programming network, the
power measurement considers the JTAG capable control registers for the original
design and the complete control register programming network for the DRFPGA
design. Since the CLBs are not affected by the change in the CLB addressable array,
they are not considered for the measurement of the programming network power
usage. To properly figure the power ratio of the programming network over the
standard programming setup, the total time necessary to program using each method
must be considered along with the power usage of the method in use. The standard
method requires all control registers within a column to be in operation through the
entire serial transmission of the four CLB bitstreams. Given that each CLB requires
640 clock cycles to program, the total time amounts to 2,560 clock cycles to reconfigure
a column of CLBs. The programming network only requires one control register to
be in operation through a single CLB programming time span (640 clock cycles) in
addition to the programming network operating throughout the entire programming
period. Assuming that only one column of CLBs (four control registers) is used
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to perform a single CLB reconfiguration for the original JTAG method, the new
CLB addressable network consumes 8.29% of the power used by the standard control
register method while the circuit is reconfiguring a single CLB. There is, however, a
2.12% increase in the leakage power drawn by the device due to the addition of the
programming network. Since the design is a reconfigurable array, and will be in a
configuration state for most of the operation time, it is the desired outcome.
One case in which the power is equal or greater is any time the programming
network is used to load more than six CLBs. The relationship between power usage
and the number of CLBs configured are depicted in Figure 4.7. Because of the addi-
tional hardware implemented to allow granular reconfiguration, the overall efficiency
per CLB is lower than the original design for larger reconfigured CLB counts. Most no-
table are the multiples of four. Because the overall efficiency per reconfigured CLB is
higher for the JTAG implementation, any reconfiguration involving entire columns will
not realize benefits using the CLB programming network. Dynamic reconfiguration
for security applications typically will not target entire columns of CLBs; therefore,
the power usage for targeted applications still favors the CLB programmable network.
Additionally, the efficiency of larger CLB arrays will favor the programmable network
due to the coarser granularity of the JTAG programming selection. For example, a 16
x 16 CLB array would require approximately 4-W to reconfigure anything less than
17 CLBs. This gives the programming network the advantage on power usage up to a
configuration of 12 CLBs. Eventually, the goal is to fabricate the DRFPGA on a scale
comparable to Virtex4r designs of 30,000 CLBs. This size would definitely favor the
programmable network for granular security minded reconfigurations.
The LUT inversion network is expected to consume less power than either the
JTAG or programming network method of reconfiguration because it broadcasts a 4-
bit opcode instead of the 626-bit bitstreams used by the other methods. This comes
at a cost of reduced capabilities, i.e. the LUT inversion network is limited to issuing
LUT commands and cannot reroute data within CLBs or affect the FFs within the
CLBs. The concept of the LUT network is similar to the CLB programming network
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since a single element, in this case a LUT, is targeted for reconfiguration. The primary
difference between the two is the LUT issues a 4-bit LUT command as opposed to a
626 bit bitstream. This significantly reduces the power usage to reconfigure a CLB,
as evidenced by Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: The programming network is more efficient for reconfigurations involv-
ing less than four CLBs as well as five or nine CLB counts. Given the expected low
CLB reconfiguration count for security minded reconfigurations, the programmable
network displays favorable characteristics as far as power usage. The LUT inversion
network is preferable to the other methods for performing LUT inversions, but is more
limited in functionality
It should be noted that to reconfigure an entire CLB, the LUT inversion process
must actually reconfigure eight LUTs. Programming the LUTs incurs an overhead
of 23 clock cycles comprised of 16 for addressing the target LUT, four for the LUT
command, and three for the LUT to execute the command. The total time to address
a single LUT for reconfiguration in a column selectable JTAG configuration is 2,560
clock cycles. It is evident the LUT inversion method requires significantly less time
in terms of clock cycles, and consumes less power. The maximum power used by the
LUT inversion process to perform LUT inversion on every LUT within the FPGA
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is less than 0.5-W. This makes it the clear choice when attempting to perform a
LUT based reconfiguration method and highlights one of the advantages of granular
reconfiguration.
4.3.3.2 DRFPGA Area Usage. The overall size of the DRFPGA with
the programming network or LUT inversion network will be larger than the original
design. The absolute size and area increase attributable to the added reconfiguration
hardware is summarized in Table 4.2. Although the LUT inversion network is very
similar in design to the programming network, the overall area impact for implemen-
tation is higher due to the use of hardware in the CLBs used to route and store the
LUT inversion commands.
Table 4.2: Area values for the original circuit, LUT inversion network, and pro-
gramming network
Area Results
Size(µm2) Area Increase
Original Design 468,462 NA
LUT Inversion Network 16,955 3.62%
Programming Network 9,845 2.10%
LUT Inversion Network
and 26,800 5.72%
Programming Network
4.3.3.3 DRFPGA Time Usage. In addition to the power and space
requirements, it is important to consider the overall impact to the reconfiguration
time resulting from the implementation of the programming network. As discussed
in the power usage section, the programming network requires less clock cycles for
any operation where fewer than four CLBs are reconfigured. The synthesis results
obtained through the Cadencer software indicates the CLB programming network
can operate at a higher clock cycle than the control register hardware. To reconfigure
a CLB with the CLB programming network, the control register is used to store
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the values in the CLB; the results are compiled using the most conservative operating
frequency for both the programming network and the JTAG reconfiguration methods.
The operating frequency for the reconfiguration hardware is conservatively set at
350 MHz. The time required to perform reconfigurations for the JTAG and CLB
programming network are shown in Figure 4.8. The values displayed are in clock
cycles to provide a clear comparison. To put the overall time in perspective, at 350
MHz a complete configuration would occur in less than 34 µs.
Figure 4.8: The programming network is more efficient for reconfigurations on any
CLB count that is not a multiple of four. Given the expected low CLB reconfigura-
tion count for security minded reconfigurations and the low percentage of CLB counts
that are evenly divisible by four, the programmable network displays favorable char-
acteristics as far as time to reconfigure. The LUT inversion network is preferable to
either of the other methods for performing LUT inversions, but is more limited in
functionality
The programming network displays clear advantages for CLB counts that are
not multiples of four. The JTAG method reconfigures columns of four and it maintains
advantages for any multiple of four due to the addressing overhead imposed by the
programming network. The overhead amounts to 14 clock cycles per CLB and is
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not enough to offset the disadvantages of the JTAG method except for the few cases
discussed. For a larger design, the JTAG advantage would occur even less frequently.
In general, the JTAG method incurs less time overhead any time the total number
of CLBs to be reconfigured is an even multiple of the column size for the FPGA. For
the 16 x 16 FPGA example mentioned previously, the JTAG would reap advantages
in time for every value of x such that x = 16n with n being any integer.
The overhead for the LUT inversion network is even lower given the substan-
tially smaller (23 vs 626) amount of data bits necessary to perform the reconfiguration.
The overall time performance numbers for the LUT inversion network in comparison
to both the JTAG and addressing networks is depicted in Figure 4.8. As with the
addressing networks, the LUT inversion network is capable of higher operating fre-
quencies than the JTAG network but is purposely limited to the conservative estimate
of 350 MHz for ease of comparison. There are no cases where it would be more ef-
ficient to perform a LUT inversion process using either other method. It should be
noted the values in Figure 4.8 represent the clock cycles necessary to reconfigure an
entire CLB (eight LUTs).
4.4 Summary
Results from testing the DRFPGA verify that the added hardware for functional
replacement and LUT inversion offers a power and time benefit over the conventional
JTAG programming for security oriented operation. The most efficient means of per-
forming reconfiguration is through the use of the LUT inversion network. The other
methods of reconfiguring, JTAG or functional replacement, offer more functionality
than the LUT inversion network. Adding the hardware supporting dynamic reconfig-
uration also adds area to the overall DRFPGA design. The area penalty imposed by
the added reconfiguration hardware is negligible at less than 6%.
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V. Analysis and Conclusions
This chapter discusses the analysis of the results from the tests implemented inChapter 4 and provides conclusions based on the analysis. The tests have ver-
ified that the proposed DRFPGA platform yields a reliable method of implementing
proprietary designs. The CLB programming network is significantly more efficient in
time and power usage for reconfiguring the circuit for most situations related to secu-
rity minded dynamic reconfiguration. The addition of the CLB addressable network
does not render the original serial loading via JTAG boundary scan unusable in any
fashion; therefore, either method can be used to program the DRFPGA, allowing the
user to reap the benefits of both implementations.
In addition to providing a basis for reliable and efficient dynamic programming,
the DRFPGA design also enables users to secure designs against bitstream theft.
The tests validate the implementation of a phased defense using the LUT inversion
algorithm to obfuscate the bitstream. The concept behind the algorithm is key in
understanding the phased process, which can be substituted to yield similar results.
The functional replacement method of reconfiguration provides a means to protect
the design through input/output obfuscation.
5.1 Bitstream Protection
As presented in Chapter 2, the bitstream is a vulnerable and valuable target
for adversaries seeking to acquire FPGA implemented designs through illegitimate
means. The defenses in place for existing FPGA platforms can be circumvented
and do not adequately protect proprietary or critical circuits. By implementing the
phased defense system of LUT inversion, the designs implemented on the DRFPGA
render the bitstream inoperable if taken from the device. By overlapping the current
Phase 2 with the next algorithm iteration Phase 1, the bitstream itself, through the
configurations stored in the CLBs, is never accurate. As long as the output for the
CLBs being reconfigured are not being used by other CLBs during the reconfiguration
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process, the phased defense will not have an adverse effect on the accuracy of the
system output.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates how the phased defense is used to maintain an inac-
curate bitstream. A relatively small circuit is used to demonstrate the process on
the test circuits visually is not reasonable and will not convey the information. The
sample circuit is shown in six discrete stages of reconfiguration. The original circuit
stage shows the initial circuit program. Each box represents a two input single output
LUT with the stored values under the LUT label. The top input represents input-0
and the lower input-1. Each reconfiguration is performed in two phases, as outlined
in the previous chapter and in Appendix B. During the second phase of an inversion,
the next inversion begins its first phase. Since the output of any LUT is incorrect as
of completion of Phase 1 (before completion of Phase 2) and there is always at least
one LUT completing Phase 1, the bitstream is always incorrect. For the example, the
reconfiguration is halted after four iterations (after iteration D) to demonstrate that
the final circuit is correct. One drawback to working in the LUT realm is that the
circuit cannot be translated directly back to a gate level implementation. Before the
reconfiguration, each LUT within the example circuit can be expressed as a single
gate. After the reconfiguration, LUT-6 and LUT-8 can no longer be expressed as
single gate functions.
In order to properly interpret the results of the circuit, a user must have knowl-
edge of the initial circuit content and the order, timing, and current state of the circuit.
If any of this information is not available, then the current circuit contents cannot
be positively determined. Since the LUT inversion algorithm’s strict adherence to a
set of rules, a user with order and timing information can determine which outputs
are valid and which outputs are not. The information may be presented as an initial
circuit schematic (interconnected LUTs), LUT inversion phases start every 10ns, and
LUT reconfiguration order based on an 8-bit LFSR with key of 01001100. While this
particular information does not pertain to the circuit below, it is an example of the
information necessary to properly determine the accurate output of the circuit.
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5.2 Reverse Engineering Defense
In addition to the threat of system compromise via bitstream theft, there also ex-
ists the risk of adversarial analysis and tampering using reverse engineering techniques
such as black box or power analysis. The functional replacement reconfiguration has
shown proficiency in obfuscating the output of a circuit. While the functional replace-
ment method can be used to place modules that are identical in input and output
locations to maintain functionality, the output and input can be relocated on the
replacement module to provide the obfuscation.
The higher-level abstraction for the functional replacement as compared to the
LUT inversion (CLBs instead of LUTs) provides the means to alter the input and
output routing. Figure 5.2 shows an example of the actual test comparator pre and
post reconfiguration.
Figure 5.2: Demonstration of the functional replacement method of obfuscating the
input and output of a given circuit. The original circuit is replaced with a smaller
module with differing input and output locations.
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The original circuit uses two CLBs to implement a comparator function. The
inputs are divided between two different input buses, with the lower four bits from
both A and B placed on a bus together and the upper four bits placed together on
a different input bus. The output is provided as a single bit indicating whether A
equals B (1 if they are equal, else 0). Since the functionality is divided between
two CLBs, there is an intermediate value passed from the first CLB to the second.
Following the functional replacement, the input bits are moved between the two input
buses. Where the bits were divided evenly by input value rank, they are divided in
a seemingly random configuration (0,1,4,5 input bit positions on one bus and 2,3,6,7
input bit positions on the other). In addition to moving the input value locations,
the output has been relocated from an output bus on the second CLB to a different
bus on the first CLB. The bus that originally carried the intermediate value is now
disconnected and has the value Z for high impedance on all the bus bits. The second
CLB is programmed to output a 1 if it receives a Z as input. The second CLB is now
disconnected and any adversary monitoring the circuit will receive a valid, if incorrect,
value.
Interpreting the results of a functional replacement reconfigured circuit is more
difficult than the LUT inversion reconfiguration. The functional replacement pro-
cess is not a clearly defined algorithm, but more of a method of using the CLB
programming network to target specific CLBs for reconfiguration. Therefore, a user
would need to have knowledge of the replacement modules, location of replacement,
and timing of replacement. The timing and location can be compared to the order
(identifying which LUT or module is being reconfigured) and timing as discussed in
the LUT inversion discussion above. The replacement module information, however,
would have to include every module that could possibly be used to replace an existing
function. This adds complexity to the process, but also provides a substantial amount
of flexibility for creating various obfuscated functions.
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5.3 Circuit Protection Effectiveness
Although the algorithms and concepts provided have a wide variety of appli-
cations throughout the reconfigurable design realm, the focus of this research is the
applicability towards protecting circuits implemented on the DRFPGA. For each vul-
nerability discussed in Chapter 2, there is a method to address it using LUT inversion,
function replacement, or both.
5.3.1 Bitstream Interception. Even with the encryption employed for the
transmission of bitstream data from off-chip storage to the FPGA, there is still the
chance that an adversary could compromise the bitstream if they were able to cap-
ture the information during transmission. If the adversary were able to obtain the
encryption key from the FPGA device, then compromise of the bitstream information
would be nearly certain.
To combat the theft and use of a bitstream from the proposed DRFPGA, a
programmer can implement the LUT inversion algorithm to provide a mangled bit-
stream. If the stored bitstream is in a state halfway through the reconfiguration of a
CLB (completed Phase 1), the bitstream would not be usable on a standard FPGA
or a DRFPGA without the knowledge of the order and current state for the recon-
figuration. The bitstream itself is keyed to the DRFPGA design and the current
reconfiguration state information. Also, the key is dynamic because the current state
changes with every reconfiguration. By encrypting the bitstream and including the
LUT inversion protection, the bitstream is adequately protected from unauthorized
acquisition.
5.3.2 Fault Injection. By injecting faulty signals at the circuit inputs, ad-
versaries are able to impact the successful accomplishment of circuit functions. This
is particularly evident in functions such as encryption algorithms that require multi-
ple iterations to achieve their full effect. It is not a trivial matter to target functions
using fault injection as the adversary must have knowledge on the timing, inputs,
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and overall functions that are being targeted. By using the functional replacement
algorithm, the DRFPGA device can minimize the potential impact of fault injection
techniques. Users can choose to modify the location of input and output pins, deny-
ing any adversary a static target for injection faults. Not only can the functional
replacement method provide a means of relocating inputs and outputs, but a user
could also implement a sequential circuit to replace a combinational circuit, tempo-
rally obfuscating the output by shifting it one or multiple clock cycles from where it
originally became available.
The LUT inversion algorithm also assists in defending against Fault Injection.
Since LUTs are chosen at random for reconfiguration, adversaries have no knowledge
of which LUT may be in the process of reconfiguring. Also, if the fault injection is
being performed mid-circuit (as opposed to from the input) using probes, then the
attacks are more difficult. After Phase 1 of the LUT inversion reconfiguration, a LUT
output that was 1 for a given input will now have an output of 0. If the adversary is
attempting to insert an incorrect value to influence the outcome of a circuit operation,
the inverted LUT will counter that threat.
5.3.3 Passive Circuit Analysis. Using passive circuit analysis, adversaries
can attempt to map the functions contained within an FPGA design. Passive analysis
may include electromagnetic or thermal observation and input or output monitoring.
When multiple observations are combined, the composite picture may provide a rea-
sonable understanding of the circuit functionality enabling more malicious attacks.
One of the primary requirements for successful passive analysis is a pattern of ac-
tivity or readings. Patterns are needed to establish a common response to values or
timing of inputs. Both the LUT inversion and functional replacement are beneficial
in combating passive analysis of circuits by denying the adversaries a static target.
Any process that alters the composition of the circuit is beneficial to countering
the threat of successful circuit mapping with passive analysis. The functional replace-
ment process provides an extremely flexible manner in which to modify the makeup
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of the circuit. As in the comparator circuit reconfiguration, inputs and outputs can
be re-mapped to different locations. Passive analysis can be used to spatially or tem-
porally locate functionality. For either case, the relocation of the circuit input and
output pins will render any further analysis useless. For example, if an adversary is
monitoring the output of the comparator test circuit to map the functionality, then
once the circuit has been reconfigured, they will be monitoring the wrong output.
Even if they were to locate the current input pin, they would need to re-accomplish
all previous tests as the input pins have been relocated as well. The comparator is a
relatively simple circuit having only 16 inputs (eight for A and eight for B) and a sin-
gle output. For a simple example like the comparator, the task of completely mapping
the circuit requires the analysis of 216 or 65,536 different input combinations. While
this task is within reach of most adversaries the addition of a reconfiguration that
occurs every 16,000 or even 32,000 clock cycles makes the process significantly more
difficult. Additionally, electromagnetic or thermal observations also provide mislead-
ing data when the core functionality (or the parts that give off the highest readings in
both electromagnetic or thermal energy) is relocated to a different physical location
within the FPGA. By moving the functionality to different locations throughout the
circuit operation, the adversary is left guessing the actual circuit arrangement after
each reconfiguration.
The LUT inversion algorithm is more limited in the protection against passive
analysis than the functional replacement, but is not without its own advantages.
Since the reconfiguration does not seek to alter the location of input and output
pins, reconfiguration will not provide the same displacement and spatial obfuscation
advantages as the functional replacement system. The LUT inversion does provide
the advantages of modifying intermediate signals between inversion LUT phases. If
an adversary is attempting to monitor a signal between LUTs, and the first LUT is
inverted (Phase 1 of the LUT inversion process), they will unknowingly capture data
inconsistent with the correct operations.
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5.3.4 Altered Bitstream Attack. In the altered bitstream attack, adversaries
attempt to modify the operation of an FPGA by mangling the bitstream itself. The
target opportunity occurs during transmission of the bitstream from the off-chip stor-
age to the actual FPGA. Modification of the bitstream potentially exposes design,
state, or critical encryption data from the device registers.
Although the bitstream must remain somewhat similar to the original design,
the functional replacement process can provide defense against the altered bitstream
attack. The algorithm must identify the boundary and function of the targeted mod-
ule(s) for replacement. If the bitstream has been altered beyond a certain point,
existing modules cannot be positively identified due to input and output combina-
tions outside of the limits of recognition or a system boundary that has been increased
to where it no longer falls within the range accepted during the boundary identifica-
tion step. For example, if the original circuit contains a 4-bit ripple carry adder and
the functional replacement system can identify this adder and replace it with an ob-
fuscated output ripple carry adder or carry look ahead designs, the altered bitstream
significantly changes the adder functionality and the altered outputs will defy identi-
fication by the system. As well, if the adder is maliciously altered to consume three
CLBs instead of two, the replacement process will not consider the entire adder when
identifying the boundary without a robust boundary identification system. This situ-
ation addresses the importance of implementing an intelligent boundary identification
and input/output analysis system as opposed to a system that operates strictly from
precompiled modules. If the system is able to identify the altered adder, it can re-
place the malicious module with a known good implementation denying the adversary
information or operation sought through tampering with the bitstream.
5.3.5 Bitstream Readback. To exploit the bitstream readback vulnerability,
an adversary must first bypass the bitstream security measures implemented on most
current FPGAs. An example of a security measure is the security bit on the Xilinxr
Virtex4r . In order to download the bitstream from the FPGA, the security bit
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must be set to allow readback. Chapter 2 discussed methods found to be successful
in altering the value of storage bits using radiation and/or optical energy. Therefore,
the security bit should not be considered a failsafe method of protecting compromise
of the bitstream data.
The LUT inversion algorithm provides a reasonable defense against the bit-
stream readback attack. Given the phased operation of the algorithm, the bitstream
stored on the device always contains incorrect information causing the overall cir-
cuit to operate in an unpredictable manner. The random selection of target LUTs
combined with the use of a key to initiate the LFSR used to provide the random
target deny the adversary a reliable method of gauging which LUT is currently in
failure state. Therefore, the downloaded bitstream would not function correctly if
downloaded to another FPGA. The key to successful operation is the storage of cur-
rent state information. Without the state information, an adversary cannot use the
bitstream in the event that it is recorded from the device.
5.4 Summary
The data collected on the DRFPGA operation confirms the platform is a valid
architecture for protecting the operation and security of circuits. Implementation of
the methods provided in this thesis alleviate substantial risks posed to FPGA designs.
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VI. Future Research
This chapter provides ideas as to the direction of future research into dynamicreconfiguration for security minded applications. Although the current research
has provided a solid, reliable platform supporting dynamic reconfiguration and cellular
autonomy, future research will yield a completely self-contained DRFPGA capable of
controlling the dynamic reconfiguration with no user intervention.
6.1 Autonomous Secure DRFPGA Platform
Future research must continually investigate security applications. The DRF-
PGA requires significant user interaction to perform the reconfigurations. In the
future, reconfiguration commands issued through the VHDL test bench files must
be handled by on-board computational resources. The Xilinxr Virtex4r provides
PowerPCr microprocessor cores on-chip and can run programs created to automate
the reconfiguration processes. Once initially programmed, the DRFPGA will require
no interaction from a human interface except for updating, reprogramming, or repair.
By containing all resources needed for reconfiguration on-chip, the security of
the device is greatly improved over issuing commands from off-chip. Additionally, self
contained units can be integrated with tampering detection methods to prevent unau-
thorized disclosure. Upon tampering detection, critical components can be erased.
6.2 Biological Computing
The LUT inversion algorithm is one example of the many uses for DRFPGAs ca-
pable of cellular autonomy. Evolutionary computing focuses on replicating biological
developments in hardware and software. By controlling the function and programming
of the DRFPGA at the lowest reconfigurable level (LUTs), the DRFPGA achieves
the required granularity. Because the LUT inversion functionality is built-in at the
LUT level, it opens the path for any number of functions to be added or substituted
relatively easily.
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In addition to the current hardware, the addition of cross talk between LUTs
(aside from the data network) could also greatly benefit the DRFPGA as an evolu-
tionary platform. Eventually, the completed device could be programmed and left
unattended. Given an ability to monitor performance, the potential exists to de-
velop designs that achieve unique, valuable attributes through development outside
the strict processes used by human programmers.
Insect swarming simulations are another example of biological computing. Using
the granular programming capability of the DRFPGA and relatively simple decision
making programs within the LUTs, the DRFPGA can be used to model select aspects
of swarm psychology.
6.3 Reliability and Self-healing
System hardware is not always in an easily accessible location. Devices may be
in place deep within the ocean, in remote locations far from civilization, or even in
space. In these situations, maintainers are not able to access the systems for repair
if a circuit should become inoperable. Therefore, it is important to build reliable
designs capable of operating in extreme environment conditions. Current methods of
increasing reliability include electromagnetic shielding, remote access for repair, and
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). Shielding serves to protect the device through
physical means designed to limit exposure to harmful radiation. Remote access is
often provided via satellite data links, Internet connections, or even dedicated data
lines. TMR is a method of increasing reliability using redundant circuits. The circuits
process the same input and provide output to a voting logic module. Based on whether
or not the outputs agree, the voting logic selects the output that is most common
among the three outputs received.
Using the proposed design, the opportunity exists to create a self-healing plat-
form for use in inaccessible locations. The functional replacement method of recon-
figuration can be used to replace faulty modules with known-good versions stored on
or off chip. In addition, certain modules may be more resistant to external variables
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than other, identical functioning modules. In this way, a circuit can be dynamically
configured and tailored to a specific environment.
6.4 Defragmentation and Self-Optimizing
Hardware implementations may incur performance penalties with regards to
fragmented construction and un-optimized designs. Once programs have been down-
loaded to an FPGA, the design is not automatically measured for performance or
efficiency. FPGAs do not have capabilities in place to reconfigure the circuit during
operation even if the performance can be measured to identify shortcomings. The
process of evaluating operational circuits and reprogramming based on defragmented
or optimized programs is time-consuming and, in some cases, not feasible.
The DRFPGA design proposed in this research can be used to perform de-
fragmentation and optimization. With on-board circuit evaluation capabilities, the
DRFPGA can be configured as an autonomous, self-optimizing platform. This offers
a unique capability not currently available in the field.
6.5 Summary
Although this thesis focused on the DRFPGA for security applications, it also
provides a framework supporting a variety of other applications. The flexibility of
the design comes in its dynamic reconfiguration capabilities as well as the granular
programming capabilities. Any design requiring dynamic reconfiguration can benefit
from the proposed design methodologies.
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Appendix A. CLB Schematic
The following schematic demonstrates the layout of a single CLB without includ-ing the actual data/programming routing information. The CLB represents the
fundamental component of the FPGA design.
Figure A.1: Schematic of a CLB as based on the schematics of the Xilinxr
Virtex4r FPGA [2].
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Appendix B. LUT Inversion Algorithm
This appendix documents the steps to perform the LUT inversion algorithm forreconfiguration. Before proceeding with the bubble pushing description, there
are some basic attributes and definitions for the circuit that must be outlined.
• All of the LUTs are of the same size with 2n one bit entries, n input lines, and
one output.
• LUTs are connected in a hypergraph configuration with nodes (LUTs) and ver-
tices (data lines between LUTs).
• LUTs have an absolute identification obtained by levelizing the circuit. A LUT’s
level is one greater than the highest level LUT feeding it. LUTs connected to
the circuit inputs only have a level of 0.
• LUTs are also identified in a relative manner. Given any two LUTs connected
together via data lines, the LUT providing the input is LUT- and the LUT
accepting the output of LUT- as an input is LUT+.
The bubble pushing step of the reconfiguration is accomplished in a total of
four steps split into two stages. The first stage involves selecting and inverting an
arbitrarily chose LUT other than a LUT whose output is directly connected to an
external devices not include in the reconfiguration.
Stage 1:
1. Step 1: Select 2n entry LUT within the circuit for initial bubble push
2. Step 2: Invert all entries, 0 through 2n−1, within the LUT
For the second stage, the following steps must be accomplished for every LUT+
connected to the initial LUT inverted in stage 1. For reference, the initial LUT will
be referred to as LUT- and the input line connected to the output of LUT- will be
input x as counted from least to most significant of the input lines (which may be a
different line for each LUT+).
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Stage 2:
1. Step 3: Given the input, x, that the LUT- connects to on LUT+, partition the
entries in LUT+ into equal segments of size 2x (for example, if the LUT- output
is connected to input 2 on LUT+ then you would partition the entries in LUT+
into segments of size 22 or 4)
2. Step 4: Exchange the contents of neighboring segment pairs starting with 0,1.
For example, segment 0 and 1 exchange contents, then 2 and 3, 4 and 5, 6 and
7, etc.
The following figures demonstrate the LUT inversion algorithm through the
reconfiguration of a 7 LUT specialized counter circuit. There are a total of 16 inputs
to and 3 outputs from the circuit. The inputs are sectioned into four sets of four
inputs each. The goal is to count how many of the four sets have at least two 1’s
on the inputs. The circuit can be broken down into two different levels, labeled as
Layer 1 and Layer 2 in the diagrams. All of the Layer 1 LUTs are LUT-’s as defined
in the previous description of the algorithm. Conversely, the LUTs in Layer 2 are all
LUT+’s.
As discussed in the process description previously, the next step will involve
exchanging neighboring segments of LUT values. The size of the segments is dictated
by the input that is connected to LUT-. Since the LUTs in use have four inputs, the
largest segment size is 20 or 8.
The circuit from the example was implemented in VHDL for the purpose of
functionally testing the original and reconfigured configuration. The VHDL code can
be found in Appendix D. For this test, each of the layer 1 LUTs are inverted followed
by the execution of the stage 2 steps on the layer 2 LUTs. The results support the
fact that the operation has not been altered due to the reconfiguration. The test
results are available in Figure B.5
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Figure B.1: Sample circuit for LUT inversion demonstration. Layer 1 LUTs are
LUT-’s as referenced above whereas the Layer 2 LUTs are LUT+’s. The three bit
Count value will express the number of input sets (as connected to the input LUTs
in layer 1) that have at least two “1” values on the input.
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Figure B.2: Demonstration of steps one and two of the LUT inversion algorithm.
LUT 0 is chosen as the target LUT for inversion and the values are inverted (step 1
and 2).
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Figure B.3: Demonstration of steps three and four of the LUT inversion algorithm.
LUT 0 is connected to LUT 4 on input 0, LUT 5 on input 1 and LUT 6 on input
3. Therefore, neighboring segments of size 20 (LUT 4), 21 (LUT 5), 23 (LUT 6) are
swapped. The LUT values on the right represent the final LUT configuration.
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Figure B.4: The final product of performing the LUT inversion algorithm on LUT
0. Every LUT in layer 2, connected to the output of LUT 0, has altered values within
the LUT.
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Appendix C. Test Circuit LUT Contents
The following tables specify the LUT contents for implementing the test circuits.
Table C.1: Ripple Carry Adder LUT Values. All slices have the same values for
the F and G LUTs. The general makeup is based on the chaining of 8 single bit full
adders as outlined in Appendix D.
8 Bit Adder LUT Contents
Bits 0-7
Input 0 Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 LUT F Values LUT G Values
A B CIN Not Used COUT SUM
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table C.2: Counter LUT Values. All slices have the same values for the F and G
LUTs. The general makeup is based on the chaining of 8 single bit counters with a
“carry in” from the previous bits indicating when all previous bits are ‘1’as outlined
in Appendix D. When all previous bits are ‘1’, the current bit flips. For bit 0, the
output toggles every clock cycle.
8 Bit Counter LUT Contents
Bits 0-7
Input 0 Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 LUT F Values LUT G Values
All previous bits Enable Q(t) Reset Q(t+1) All previous and
= ‘1’ Count Count current bits = ‘1’
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
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Table C.3: Comparator LUT Values for stage 1 of the comparator operation. All
slices have the same values for the F and G LUTs. There are 4 slices (8 LUTs) in
stage 1 of the comparator process. Each Slice compares two concurrent input value
pairs, Ax−1 = Bx−1 and Ax = Bx for x = 2n : n = 0, 1, 2, 3.
8 Bit Original Comparator LUT Contents
Bits 0-7 Stage 1 LUT Contents
Input 0 Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 LUT F Values LUT G Values
Ax Bx Ax+1 Bx+1 Ax = Bx Ax+1 = Bx+1
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table C.4: Comparator LUT Values for stage 2 of the comparator operation. All
slices have the same values for the F-LUTs and G-LUTs. The LUTs are configured in
a hierarchical design wherein the previous matches are, themselves matched. In this
manner, any pair of original inputs that do not match will cause the final value to be
0. The slice names are listed in the top row to designate which slice handles which
level of the hierarchy.
8 Bit Original Comparator LUT Contents
Bits 0-7 Stage 2 LUT Contents
Slice Input 0 Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 LUT F Values LUT G Values
M0 A1 = B1 A5 = B5 A0 = B0 A4 = B4 A4−5 = B4−5 A0−1 = B0−1
M1 A3 = B3 A7 = B7 A2 = B2 A6 = B6 A6−7 = B6−7 A2−3 = B2−3
L0 A0−1 = B0−1 A2−3 = B2−3 A4−5 = B4−5 A6−7 = B6−7 A4−7 = B4−7 A0−3 = B0−3
L1 A0−3 = B0−3 A4−7 = B4−7 ‘1’ ‘1’ NA A=B
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table C.5: Comparator LUT Values for the functional replacement comparator,
phase 1. The overall size of the comparator is reduced to 3 from the 8 used for the
original design. All slices have the same values for the F-LUTs and G-LUTs, the
only difference being the inputs fed to the LUT. The general layout consists of the
first two LUTs, which compare eight pairs of bits from the input and the third LUT,
which outputs a 1 if all the pairs match and a 0 otherwise. The LUT relationship is
graphically demonstrated in Appendix D.
8 Bit Replacement Comparator LUT Contents
Bits 0-7 Stage 1 LUT Contents
LUT Input 0 Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 LUT Values
G A0 B0 A1 B1 A0 = B0 and A1 = B1
F A2 B2 A3 B3 A2 = B2 and A3 = B3
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
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Table C.6: Comparator LUT Values. The Stage 2 is contained completely within
the G-LUT of a single slice (the L0 Slice). The LUTs are configured in a hierarchical
design wherein the previous matches are, themselves matched. In this manner, any
pair of original input matches that are false cause the final value to be 0.
8 Bit Replacement Comparator LUT Contents
Bits 0-7 Stage 2 LUT Contents
Input 0 Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 LUT G Values
A0−1 = B0−1 A2−3 = B2−3 A4−5 = B4−5 A6−7 = B6−7 A = B
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
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Appendix D. Test Circuit Schematics
This appendix documents the test circuit schematics using CLB functional blockdiagrams. Each circuit is specified as to the LUT and routing usage.
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Figure D.1: Test circuit for 8-bit adder, bits 0-7 and the carry in. The 4-bit adder
can be implemented using this circuit and taking the outputs for the first four bits of
the 8-bit adder and using the single bit carry signal as the final carry out.
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Figure D.2: Test circuit for 8-bit counter. A 4-bit counter can be implemented
using this circuit and taking the outputs for the first four bits of the 8-bit adder.
108
Figure D.3: Test circuit for 8-bit comparator. This is the original circuit before the
functional replacement reconfiguration. Figure D.4 demonstrates the post functional
replacement circuit.
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Figure D.4: Test circuit for 8-bit comparator circuit used for functional replacement.
This circuit, housed in a single CLB, replaces the original circuit found in Figure
D.3. In addition to reducing the total resources needed for circuit implementation,
the replacement circuit also spatially obfuscates the output by placing it on a different
output bus/pin (bit 16 on Bus 0 instead of bit 20 on Bus 1).
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Appendix E. JTAG Programming Network Example
The following appendix serves to provide a simple example of a JTAG program-ming network. The example below illustrates the overall arrangement of the
boundary scan cells and their relationship to the CLB control registers.
The JTAG Network programs the FPGA CLBs in a serial, sequential manner.
Each CLB control register is connected to the other control registers along a 1-bit wide
serial data path. For the example demonstrated in Figure E.1, the control registers
each hold 626 bits per CLB for the bitstream.
Figure E.1: A simplified, abstract example of a JTAG programming network for
an eight CLB FPGA.
The connection to the serial data path is made through a boundary cell, which
permits selection of programming or operating modes and contains logic circuits to
facilitate the passing of data through the data path to other boundary cells. The
JTAG boundary scan cell is described in more detail in Chapter 2. The following
steps are followed to accomplish the programming process (some steps/components
omitted for clarity).
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1. The boundary cells are configured for “pass-through” operation. Chapter 2
contains more data on the specifics of this configuration method.
2. The ShiftDR clock is used to pass the current data stream along the JTAG
Network. Once the entire data stream is loaded into the JTAG Network, each
boundary cell will contain one bit (which is the first bit to be loaded into the
control registers). The process requires one clock cycle per boundary cell in the
JTAG Network.
3. Once the boundary cells have their bit of information, the UpdateDR clock
is used to latch the data into the most significant bit of the control registers,
shifting the data downwards (from most to least significant) similar to a shift
register.
4. The previous steps are repeated for each bit within the bitstream. For exam-
ple, the FPGA developed for this research effort would require the steps to be
repeated a total of 626 times.
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Appendix F. CLB Addressable Programming Network Example
The following appendix serves to provide a simple example of the CLB address-able network. The LUT inversion network is nearly identical with the exception
of more addressing capabilities through the sub-routers (due to the fact that there are
eight times as many LUTs as CLBs) and the substitution of LUT inversion registers
instead of the control registers. The example below illustrates the overall arrangement
of the chains, routers, and end registers.
The CLB addressable network programs the FPGA CLBs in random access
manner. Each CLB control register is connected to a dedicated line from a sub-router
module. For the example demonstrated in Figure F.1, the control registers each hold
626 bits per CLB for the bitstream. In the case of the LUT inversion network, the
registers would store a total of four bits each for the LUT inversion command.
Figure F.1: A simplified, abstract example of a CLB addressable programming
network for a 16 CLB FPGA.
Any single CLB Control Register can be targeted for programming by using
an addressing system. For example, the CLB Control Register marked with the star
corresponds to an address of ”1010” (Channel router ‘1’, Sub Router ‘0’, CLB Control
Register “10”). Each Channel Router has a “chain” of Sub Routers connected to it
which, in turn, have 4 CLBs connected to them. The process of programming a
113
selected CLB Control Register involves the following steps (some components/steps
omitted for clarity).
1. The network is issued a “reset” command.
2. The address is sent along the serial data line. Each Channel Router examines
the first bit to determine whether the final target CLB falls within its chain.
3. If the Channel Router’s chain contains the target CLB, then the data stream
(minus the Channel Router address portion) is broadcast to the Sub Routers
falling within the chain.
4. The Sub Router examines the first bit it receives (but the second bit of the data
stream overall) to determine whether the final target CLB is one of the four
connected to it.
5. If the Sub Router is connected to the target CLB, then it reads the next two
bits from the data stream to determine which CLB will receive the data.
6. Once the target CLB is determined, the data for that CLB is broadcast along
the CLB Addressable Network.
7. For example, in order to store the data stream ”0101” at the Control Register
marked with the star, the following bitstream would be passed through the
Serial Data In: “10100101...” where the first four bits represent the CLB Control
Register address and the remaining 626 bits represent the data to be stored at
the target CLB Control Register.
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